KHMER INTELLIGENCE
Khmer
Intelligence (KI) is a non-government organisation whose objective is to collect
sensitive information from non-easily accessible sources to help Khmer and
foreign observers better follow and understand the situation in Cambodia.
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classified according to five levels of reliability:
Official or Semi-Official (1), Very
Reliable (2), Reliable (3), Insistent
Rumour (4), Rumour (5).
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29 September 2003
CPP plot to mislead the King into going to the Assembly
(2)
The opening of the National Assembly on September 27 looked like a farce because
King Norodom Sihanouk reportedly changed his mind twice before finally deciding
not to preside over the ceremony (KI, 27 September 2003: “National Assembly
fails to legally meet”). In fact, there was a CPP plot to mislead the King into
presiding over the Assembly’s inaugural session.
It was a tumultuous day. At 9:30 a.m. Royal Palace Minister Kong Sam Ol (from
the CPP) told the King that opposition leader Sam Rainsy had changed his mind
and finally decided to attend the ceremony. The King then, in line with his
promise to go to the Assembly only in the presence of parliamentarians from the
three parties, accepted to preside over the ceremony in person. He was going to
leave the Royal Palace slightly before 10:00 a.m. when he received a handwritten
message from Sam Rainsy saying the opposition was maintaining its boycott. The
King then got off his car and announced he would definitely not go to the
Assembly.
Yesterday, Sam Rainsy told the King he had never changed his mind on the
subject. When pressed to elaborate on the source of his misleading information,
Kong Sam Ol this morning wrote the King a letter saying he learned about Sam
Rainsy’s alleged plan (“to attend the ceremony”) from Sok An and Sar Kheng,
respectively CPP Minister at the Office of the Council of Ministers, and CPP
Minister of Interior, who themselves claimed to have obtained the false
information from a radio station named FM 102. But this afternoon, the director
of FM 102 Radio issued a statement denying having collected, communicated or
broadcast such information on September 27.
It is clear that the CPP did make a desperate attempt to lure the King into the
Assembly to preside over (i.e. endorse) a controversial inauguration.
28 September 2003 7:00 p.m. Phnom Penh time
Cambodia with no legitimate government at ASEAN summit
(1)
At the forthcoming ASEAN summit meeting to take place in Bali (Indonesia) on 7-8 October
2003, the Cambodian delegation headed by Hun Sen will be given a special and
embarrassing status since Cambodia has no legitimate government after the
controversial opening of the new National Assembly on September 27. The current
government is now perceived by many as illegitimate since it was formed from the
old Assembly, which has ceased to exist, while the new Assembly is unable to
meet properly and has yet to endorse a new government in line with the
Constitution. The current government has become, at best, a caretaker government
that cannot commit the country as before September 27. No new and legitimate
government is expected to be formed at least several days or weeks after the
swearing-in ceremony at the Royal Palace on October 4 (KI, 27 September 2003:
“King summons parliamentarians from the three parties”).
Financial crisis looming (2)
A financial crisis is looming in Cambodia, with far-reaching implications that
will have to be faced by the current caretaker government if it is going to last
for some time. International financial institutions (World Bank, ADB, IMF) and
donor countries are reassessing the political situation from a legal point of
view in order not to unduly commit themselves. Foreign investors are holding
back with increased caution because of the political uncertainty. Corruption,
already rampant with devastating effects, is worsening with the wait-and-see and
free-for-all attitude of government employees in general and tax collectors in
particular. State revenues, in particular custom duties, have started to
decline. The government is increasingly cash-strapped, being obliged to delay
the payment of salaries for many State employees, with priority given to
policemen, soldiers and teachers (in that order, to avoid political instability
and social unrest). Many public and social services, especially those related to
health, public works and justice, have to be neglected.
27 September 2003
7:00 p.m. Phnom Penh time
King summons parliamentarians from the three parties
(1)
In a royal message to the nation issued this afternoon, the King invites the 123
newly elected National Assembly members from the three major political parties (CPP,
Funcinpec, SRP) to the Royal Palace for a solemn swearing-in ceremony on
Saturday, 4 October 2003. The ceremony will start at 5:00 p.m. and will be
followed by a dinner offered by the monarch. The King specifies in his message
that even if one or two parties decide not to positively respond to his
invitation, he will still preside over the swearing-in ceremony and maintain the
dinner. In fact, according to our information, the three parties have already
(i.e. immediately) accepted the royal invitation.
Negotiations between the three parties to break the current political deadlock
are expected to start under the auspices of the monarch after their October 4
meeting.
11:00 a.m. Phnom Penh time
National Assembly fails to legally meet (1)
As we announced yesterday (KI, 26 September 2003: “No National Assembly members
from Funcinpec and SRP will attend tomorrow’s official meeting”), only 73 newly
elected parliamentarians from the CPP showed up earlier this morning at what was
supposed to be an inauguration of the National Assembly’s third legislature.
Until the last minute, the CPP circulated rumors that the King would come to
preside over the ceremony. Those rumors, which caused a delay coupled with
impromptu and burlesque changes in the protocol, proved to be wrong. Eventually,
the ceremony took place under the chairmanship of CCP President Chea Sim, who
simply made a 10-minute speech. In total, the ceremony lasted no longer than 15
minutes. The parliamentarians present did not swear in. Only some photos were
taken. CPP top officials (Chea Sim, Hun Sen, Heng Samrin) seemed to be
embarrassed by the way the ceremony had to be conducted, and they did not make
any statement before quickly leaving the Assembly compound.
26 September 2003
No National
Assembly members from Funcinpec and SRP will attend tomorrow’s official meeting
(2)
Implementing a long-announced resolution of the Alliance of Democrats, neither
Funcinpec nor Sam Rainsy Party will send their newly elected National Assembly
members to the inauguration of the National Assembly’s third term scheduled for
tomorrow morning.
The 50 parliamentarians from the two Alliance parties will instead meet and
spend the whole morning at Prince Norodom Ranariddh’s residence (for Funcinpec
MPs) or at the Sam Rainsy Party headquarters (for SRP MPs).
Only the 73 newly elected parliamentarians from the CPP are expected to attend
tomorrow’s official meeting at the National Assembly.
Prince
Ranariddh complains about French ambassador’s attitude
(2)
Funcinpec President Prince Norodom Ranariddh wrote last week to France’s Foreign
Affairs Minister Dominique de Villepin to complain about the attitude of the
French Ambassador in Cambodia, André-Jean Libourel, whom Ranariddh accuses of
being biased toward Prime Minister Hun Sen’s CPP. Next month, Libourel will
definitively leave Cambodia, ending a five-year mission.
Cambodian MP
meets with Italian government official
(1)
On 22 September 2003, Member of Parliament Tioulong Saumura from the Sam Rainsy
Party, who is also Deputy Secretary-General of the Alliance of Democrats, went
to Rome to meet
with Ms. Margherita Boniver, Italy’s Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs in charge of Asia and Human Rights. Italy currently holds the presidency
of the European Union.
25 September 2003
1,000 policemen to intimidate MPs (2)
The Interior Ministry has just sent a letter to National Assembly
Secretary-General Kol Pheng informing him that 500 policemen will be deployed in
the National Assembly compound on 27 September in order to “ensure security” for
the newly elected parliamentarians who will be holding on that day the inaugural
session of the Assembly’s third legislature. The letter specifies that 500
additional policemen will be stationed outside the Assembly compound, in a way
so as to surround the Assembly building in order to “protect Members of
Parliament from external danger”.
US Senate Majority Leader expresses concern for the
safety of political opponents (1)
On September 24, US Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist declared in a public
statement: “The situation in Cambodia is growing cause for concern. We applaud
the courage and determination of the democratic opposition to chart a new course
for that country, but we remain gravely concerned for their safety.” Senate
Majority Whip Mitch McConnel added to the above statement: “Unfortunately, some
senior leaders in the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) have a penchant for
violence and intimidation.”
23 September 2003
CPP rejects latest SRP proposal (1)
This afternoon, on behalf of the ruling CPP, Prime Minister Hun Sen rejected the
latest proposal made by the opposition SRP in order to ensure the participation
of the 50 MPs elect from the Alliance of Democrats (Funcinpec + SRP) in the
inaugural ceremony of the new National Assembly scheduled for 27 September (KI,
22 September 2003: “Opposition makes concession to break political deadlock”).
Therefore, only the 73 MPs elect from the CPP will attend the ceremony. There
are 4 to 8 renegade MPs elect from Funcinpec and/or SRP who could also join the
controversial meeting. The quorum for any working meeting of the National
Assembly to proceed legally is 87.
22 September 2003
China and Vietnam reassessing the situation in Cambodia
(3)
China and Vietnam are reassessing the situation in Cambodia in light of the
present political deadlock and are starting to examine the possibility of a
sidelining of current Prime Minister Hun Sen. The two Asian communist countries
are starting to seek assurances that any new Cambodian leaders pay due attention
to what Beijing and Hanoi consider their fundamental interests.
- For China: respect for the “one-China policy”, and no Khmer Rouge tribunal
that would expose China’s support for the genocidal Pol Pot regime in 1975-1979.
- For Vietnam: no revision of border treaties signed with Cambodia in the
1980’s, and no tolerance for political refugees from Vietnam that could create
instability for that country.
Opposition makes concession to break political deadlock
(1)
Following a three-hour meeting of top leaders of the Alliance of Democrats, the
opposition Sam Rainsy Party issued today a statement outlining its “ultimate
concession for the sake of the nation”. The statement reads: “We now amend our
demand for a vote recounting for the provinces of Svay Rieng and Kompong Thom.
The recounting could now be carried out after [the inauguration of the new
National Assembly scheduled for] 27 September, provided the two contested
parliamentary seats are suspended in the meantime from the two CPP MPs declared
elected for the two provinces by the National Election Committee. (...). If the
CPP responds positively to our ultimate concession, 121 MPs from the three
political parties will attend the 27 September ceremony, fulfilling the wishes
of His Majesty the King.” (KI, 15 September 2003: “CPP promptly reacts to King
Sihanouk’s intention not to inaugurate the new National Assembly”).
21 September 2003
Many diplomats are revising their assessment of
Cambodia’s political situation (2)
Given the political deadlock facing Cambodia since the July 27 election,
diplomats here realize that with each passing day:
1- The current government loses a bit of its legitimacy, which will totally
disappear after September 27 if the new National Assembly cannot be convened
according to the terms of the Constitution;
- The Alliance of Democrats (Funcinpec + SRP) gains more and more credibility,
while there was a lot of skepticism about its durability immediately following
its creation in early August;
- The ruling CPP faces increasingly serious internal problems relative to the
maintenance of Mr. Hun Sen as the sole candidate for prime minister, since the
Alliance of Democrats adamantly demands a new prime minister, who could
acceptably be CPP President Chea Sim.
Hun Sen wants to force Chea Sim to resign from his newly
won MP position (3)
On September 20, CPP Royal Palace Minister Kong Sam Ol went to see CPP President
Chea Sim to tell him that Queen Monineath Sihanouk had suggested -- implicitly
with the approbation of King Norodom Sihanouk -- that he (Chea Sim) should
resign from his newly won position of National Assembly member (he was the CPP
top-of-the-list candidate for Phnom Penh) if he wants to properly represent the
King at the inauguration ceremony of the new National Assembly on September 27,
when he would inadequately be only a “primus inter pares” without prior
resignation.
In fact, the Queen had never asked Kong Sam Ol to make such a suggestion to Chea
Sim. Kong Sam Ol disgracefully took the initiative himself under the
instructions of Prime Minister and CPP Vice-President Hun Sen. The latter wants
Chea Sim to give up his MP position because, according to Article 100 of the
Constitution, a prime minister must be a National Assembly member, and he (Hun
Sen) wants to eliminate Chea Sim as a rival in the competition for the position
of prime minister.
This is not the first time that Kong Sam Ol fraudulently and deceitfully uses
the names of the King and/or the Queen. On September 15, Kong Sam Ol
fraudulently and deceitfully used the name of the King to convene the new
National Assembly on September 27 (KI, 15 September 2003: “CPP promptly reacts
to King Sihanouk’s intention not to inaugurate the new National Assembly”).
National Assembly or CPP Assembly? (2)
Under the present circumstances, the 50 newly elected parliamentarians from
Funcinpec and SRP will boycott the inauguration ceremony of the new National
Assembly scheduled by the CPP for September 27. Therefore, only 73
parliamentarians from the CPP will take part in the ceremony, which will be
presided over by CPP President Chea Sim -- himself a newly elected Assembly
member -- while the voluntarily absent King has decided not to send any
congratulations or best wishes message to this “half Assembly”.
The question that many people now ask is whether such a ceremony is legally
valid or means anything. Article 76 of the Constitution states: “The National
Assembly is composed of at least 120 representatives of the people.” Article 82
requires that the first session of the National Assembly be personally convened
by the King, who has traditionally up to now presided over the inauguration
ceremony in person. In this spirit, the inauguration ceremony is intended to
officially give birth to a new body, which must be composed of at least 120
members to be complete and duly constituted.
Some leaders of the Alliance of Democrats claim that the traditional and
official ceremony of proclamation of the new Assembly by the King is comparable
to the delivery of a baby, with the King acting as a midwife. They ask the
following questions: Can anybody deliver only half a baby and claim that the
other half will come later? Can any legal body be declared duly formed when half
of its legal components is missing? Is such a baby or new legal body viable? Can
the “midwife” be proud of helping deliver such a baby, who looks like a monster
with only one leg, one arm, and one eye?
Actually, the 73 Assembly members from the CPP exclusively who will gather on
September 27 will not form a “National Assembly”, but a “CPP Assembly”. This
partisan Assembly should not meet at the National Assembly building, but at the
CPP headquarters in the district of Chamcar Mon, near Chea Sim’s residence.
19 September 2003
A coup d’état may be under way (3)
Because of the King’s decision not to open himself the National Assembly’s third
term and to designate CPP President Chea Sim to represent him instead (see the
King’s message to the nation issued today in which he stated he would not be
bullied by certain elements of the ruling party), a CPP faction led by Hun Sen
may stage a coup d’état in the next few days in order to force the leaders of
Funcinpec and SRP to attend the ceremony scheduled for 27 September, so that the
King would have no more reasons to refuse to preside over the ceremony.
18 September 2003
National Assembly unlikely to meet on 27 September
(2)
In spite of intensive efforts by the CPP to make the King change his mind about
not presiding over the opening ceremony of the third term of the National
Assembly on 27 September (KI, 16 September 2003: “King’s message confirms CPP’s
fraudulent attempt to convene the National Assembly”), the likelihood of such an
event taking place at that date is minimum.
On 17 September, Funcinpec President Prince Norodom Ranariddh, who is also
President of the Alliance of Democrats, wrote to inform the monarch that the 26
Funcinpec newly elected parliamentarians would attend the scheduled ceremony if
there will be at least 120 representatives of the people taking part in that
first session of the new Assembly, in accordance with article 76 of the
Constitution.
Since opposition leader Sam Rainsy has informed the King that the 24 SRP newly
elected parliamentarians would not attend the ceremony (KI, 15 September 2003:
“CPP promptly reacts to King Sihanouk’s intention not to inaugurate the new
National Assembly”), therefore bringing down the number of parliamentarians
present at a possible inauguration meeting to a maximum of 99 (123 minus 24),
Funcinpec Assembly members consistently will not join the meeting.
In September 1998, before an agreement under the auspices of the King was
reached by the same three major political parties to unanimously attend a
similar inauguration ceremony at the King’s residence in Siem Reap city, the
late CPP Justice Minister Chem Snguon asked the King to open the second term of
the National Assembly on 24 September 1998 even without the participation of
Members of Parliament from the other two parties (Funcinpec and SRP), meaning
that the King would have to preside over an inauguration ceremony attended by
only 64 parliamentarians (out of 122) all from the CPP. The King’s reply was: “I
cannot open only half of our National Assembly because I am the King of all
Cambodians.”
16 September 2003
King’s message confirms CPP’s fraudulent attempt to
convene the National Assembly (2)
Following his yesterday’s letter to opposition leader Sam Rainsy announcing that
he would be unable to open the Parliament at the end of this month because of a
boycott by the SRP (KI, 15 September 2003: “CPP promptly reacts to King
Sihanouk’s intention not to inaugurate the new National Assembly”), King Norodom
Sihanouk issued this morning a message to the Cambodian people confirming his
refusal to open the third parliamentary session that was tentatively scheduled
for “25, or 26, or 27 September 2003”.
This morning’s message from the monarch confirms that the letter hastily written
and signed last night by Royal Palace Minister Kong Sam Ol was a ploy by the CPP,
which fraudulently used the name and the authority of the king to try to lure
newly elected or re-elected parliamentarians from Funcinpec and SRP into an
inaugural session of the National Assembly that – according to Kong Sam Ol’s
misleading letter – would be definitely held on 27 September and presided over
by the king in person.
On 18 September 1998, King Norodom Sihanouk, following the Constitution, wrote
and signed himself a letter to each newly elected parliamentarian to convene
them to an inaugural meeting of the National Assembly to be presided over by the
monarch in person. The meeting took place on 24 September at the Royal Residence
in Siem Reap city, with the participation of all the 122 parliamentarians, and
was immediately followed by a swearing-in ceremony in front of Angkor Wat temples.
Impact on the country of a delay in convening the
National Assembly (2)
To the question whether his party’s boycott of the Assembly – if its demand for
a ballot recounting is not accepted by the CPP – would cause additional hardship
to the Cambodian people, opposition leader Sam Rainsy provided a kind of answer
in his 15 September 2003 letter to the King, in which he asserts that several
more days needed for ballot recounting would not create more difficulties for
the people, since they are already suffering intensely given a worsening
poverty, a continuous deforestation, successive ecological disasters, food
shortage, land grab, massive joblessness, derelict public and social services,
appalling record of increasing illiteracy, crime and mortality, in a country
that is dying slowly. “Neither the reconvening of a dubious National Assembly
nor the formation of a new government headed by the same corrupt leaders
implementing the same devastating policies will be able to either relieve the
sufferings of our people or prolong the death of our nation.”
The opposition claims to push for a system change through a series of
fundamental reforms.
15 September 2003
CPP promptly reacts to King Sihanouk’s intention not to
inaugurate the new National Assembly (2)
This morning (7:00 a.m. Phnom Penh time), opposition leader Sam Rainsy sent a
letter by email to King Norodom Sihanouk informing the monarch that the 24 newly
elected parliamentarians from his party (SRP) would not attend the inauguration
ceremony of the National Assembly scheduled for the end of this month, unless
the ruling CPP accepts a ballot recounting for two provinces – Svay Rieng and
Kompong Thom – where the SRP slightly missed to win a seat or an additional seat
at the National Assembly by only a few hundreds votes (KI, 15 August 2003: “Stunning
refusal by the NEC to conduct ballot recounting”).
King Sihanouk replied to Sam Rainsy in a letter sent also by email by the Royal
Palace Cabinet this afternoon (6:00 p.m.), saying in substance: “I want to
inform you that because your party doesn’t accept to attend the National
Assembly on 25, or 26, or 27 September, I will not go to the Assembly for the
inauguration of its third term.” The King’s response to Sam Rainsy is consistent
with his 2 September 2003 message to the Cambodian people: “According to our
1993 Constitution, I, in my capacity as King of Cambodia, must inaugurate the
new National Assembly (...). I wish to inform the respected Cambodian people
that, if among the three major political parties, namely the Cambodian People’s
Party, the Funcinpec Party and the Sam Rainsy Party (...), there is one or two
parties that do not accept to attend the [inaugural session of the] National
Assembly on 25, or 26, or 27 September, that party must be responsible before
the people and our Constitution, and, on my part, I will not be able to
inaugurate the new Assembly and must not be held responsible on this issue.”
Fearing the possibility that the newly elected Assembly might not be able to
convene by the end of this month, thus jeopardizing the formation of a new
government led by outgoing Prime Minister Hun Sen, the CPP ordered Royal Palace
Minister Kong Sam Ol to urgently issue this evening (9:00 p.m.) a letter sent by
fax or delivered by special porter to each of the 123 newly elected
parliamentarians from all parties asking them, “on behalf and under the
instructions of His Majesty the King”, to attend “on 27 September 2003, at 10:00
a.m.”, the Assembly’s inauguration ceremony that will be “presided over by His
Majesty the King”. This CPP’s last minute maneuver based on an obviously
distorted presentation of the King’s intention, runs counter the Constitution
which states that the King must personally convene and open in person any newly
elected National Assembly (Article 82). The Constitution also states that the
National Assembly must be composed of at least 120 representatives of the people
(Article 76), meaning that practically all parliamentarians from all political parties – at
least for this term – must accept to fulfill their function in order for the
Assembly to proceed legally.
4 September 2003
Chea Sophara has his passport confiscated (3)
Former Phnom Penh Governor Chea Sophara, who was demoted in the wake of the
January 29 anti-Thai riots, is still prevented from traveling abroad, since his
passport was confiscated upon his return to Cambodia after a short trip to
France last February (KI, 13 February 2003: “Chea Sophara left Cambodia today”).
When the riots took place, the popular and ambitious governor was visiting the
northern province of Preah Vihear with several high-ranking CPP officials who
shared his views that Thailand’s influence must be contained.
Prime Minister Hun Sen was looking for an opportunity to sideline a dangerous
rival before the July election (KI, 12 February 2003: “Chea
Sophara’s removal was organized like a mini coup d’état”; KI, 11 February 2003:
“Chea Sophara is fired”;
KI, 10 February 2003: “Chea Sophara targeted by Hun Sen”; KI, 4 November
2002: “Chea Sophara will challenge Hun Sen as CPP candidate for premiership”).
Chea Sophara was successfully used as a scapegoat to diffuse tension between
Cambodia and Thailand after the January 29 incident, allowing at the same time
Hun Sen to get rid of his most formidable challenger within the CPP. The
maneuver was performed with the blessing of Vietnam, which sees Hun Sen as the
strongest pillar for a friendly regime in Cambodia.
3 September 2003
China urges King Sihanouk not to abdicate (3)
While the news seemed incredible at that time, Khmer Intelligence was the first,
last year, to expose King Norodom Sihanouk’s desire to abdicate (KI, 25
September 2002, “King may abdicate”). The king formulated his desire from
Beijing. But over the last few months, in Phnom Penh, he has been repeating that
he would happily renounce the throne. In a message dated September 1st,
he wrote in French: “Je ne rêve que d’abdication” (I only dream of abdicating).
There are several possible reasons that could explain why the king, who has
expressed his profound frustrations with the current situation in Cambodia, has
nevertheless refrained from actually abdicating. One of these reasons could be
the position of China, which exerts its influence on Cambodia largely through
its good relations with the Royal Palace. In the above-mentioned message, the
king indirectly hinted at China’s position with regard to a possible abdication
by saying that following such a dramatic decision, he would consider going to
live not in China, but in North Korea where he has been warmly invited by Kim
Djong Il.
For more detail:
www.norodomsihanouk.info
Another version of the killing of three Western hostages
in 1994 (2)
Responding to an allegation in Asia Times (29 August 2003, “Cambodia:
The tale of two leaders”, by Alan Boyd) about the killing of
three Western hostages in Cambodia in 1994, opposition leader Sam Rainsy
reiterated his version of the story, which contradicted the report presented by
the Phnom Penh government with the support of some diplomats at that time.
"Another miscalculation by Rainsy has been his largely fruitless efforts to
identify the CPP as sympathetic to the Khmer Rouge, largely because the
government had offered an amnesty so it could disband the former communist
movement. Diplomats reacted angrily to Rainsy's implication in 1995, never
proven, that the CPP had 'deliberately sacrificed' three Western tourists who
were killed after they strayed into a Khmer Rouge zone."
SR: The author's intention to unfairly tarnish my reputation clearly appears in
his inaccurate and inconsistent presentation of facts. How could I, in 1995, try
to make any political gain from the amnesty the Cambodian government had offered
to the Khmer Rouge, since that amnesty was in fact granted only in 1996? In my
capacity as finance minister, I personally remitted in July 1994 the money to be
paid to the Khmer Rouge as ransom to secure the release of the three Western
hostages. But a few months later, the hostages were killed, apparently as a
result of a cynical game played by the Cambodian government. The game was to
push the Khmer Rouge to make a desperate and tragic decision by not respecting
the promise to pay them the ransom and stop bombing their positions on the
ground. The ultimate objective of the government was to put all the blame for
the tragedy on the Khmer Rouge in the eyes of foreign countries and to get more
foreign (financial and military) aid to fight the rebel movement. I met with
members of the hostages' families - the Wilsons in Australia and the Braquets in
France - as well as parliamentarians in Canberra and Paris who were not so naive
as to believe the version of the events given by complacent diplomats from their
respective countries, who just swallowed the Cambodian government's misleading
account of what had happened. [End]
For more detail: www.atimes.com
30 August 2003
Assembly must be convened on September 23 at the latest
(2)
According to the Constitution, the National Assembly
must be convened within 60 days of the general election. Since the last election
took place on July 27, the King is supposed to convene the Assembly not later
than September 25 in theory. But September 25 this year will coincide with a
holiday, being part of a three-day holiday related to the celebration of the 10th
anniversary of King Norodom Sihanouk’s re-accession to the throne and Phchum Ben
religious festivities (September 24, 25 and 26). Therefore, the Assembly must be
convened on September 23, 2003 at the latest in order to respect the
Constitution and public holidays.
Hun Sen to become the world’s longest serving prime
minister (2)
After the expected resignation of Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir
next October, Hun Sen will become the longest serving prime minister in the
world. Among all top leaders including presidents, he will rank number 6 in
terms of seniority.
1- Fidel Catro, President of Cuba, since 1959
2- Gnassingbe Eyadema, President of Togo, since 1967
3- Moammar Gaddafi, President of Libya, since 1969
4- Omar Bongo, President of Gabon, since 1972
5- Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, since 1980
6- Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia, since 1985. From 1979 to early 1985, he
had been Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister in the
Vietnamese-installed government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.
29 August 2003
CPP considering resorting to old Assembly to preserve
Hun Sen’s position (2)
Because they realize the increasing difficulty for Hun Sen to remain in power
following the formation of the Alliance of Democrats, which is determined not to
renew the current prime minister’s mandate for another five-year term, pro-Hun
Sen elements within the CPP are considering convening – for a last time – the
outgoing National Assembly in order to amend the Constitution so as to allow the
formation of a government with the support of a fifty percent majority in
Parliament. The objective is to abolish the currently paralyzing requirement for
a two-thirds majority contained in the present Constitution as well as the even
more stringent requirement represented by a seven-tenths quorum contained in the
National Assembly internal rules.
The CPP, which controls 64 seats out of 122 in the outgoing Assembly, believes
it could secure the support of 86 parliamentarians (to meet the seven-tenths
quorum) by buying 22 parliamentarians from Funcinpec and/or SRP, especially
among those MPs who have not been re-elected at the July 27, 2003 election.
In the new Assembly of 123 members, the CPP, which has been allocated 73 seats,
would need to buy only 14 parliamentarians from other parties to secure a quorum
of 87, covering a two-thirds majority of 82. But the extra 14 parliamentarians
needed by the CPP would be harder to identify and buy since they have just been
elected or re-elected for a five-year term and would be more reluctant to face
the risk of being expelled from their party and stripped of their parliamentary
seat. Unlike at the UN-organized election in 1993, the names of candidates were
not made widely known to the public at the 2003 election, and nearly all the
voters voted for a party, according to the proportional representation system,
without even knowing the names of the party candidates.
Hun Sen contradicting himself about the Alliance (2)
Speaking on August 25 about the newly formed Alliance of Democrats (KI, 27
August 2003, “Hun Sen’s statement about negotiation partners was intended for
rival CPP leaders”), Prime Minister Hun Sen said the Alliance “died on the very
day of its birth” to try to justify his refusal to negotiate with the Alliance,
which asks for his removal. He went on saying that he expected negotiations to
form a new government to begin only after the new Assembly will have been
convened by the King, hopefully sometime in late September. He implied that, for
the time being and until the Assembly meets, he had lost any hope to negotiate
individually with Funcinpec and SRP because of the... Alliance, which therefore
looks vibrant.
No massive street protests against election results
(2)
On August 30, the National Election Committee (NEC) will proclaim the “final
election results”, which will correspond exactly to the figures first released
by the ruling CPP immediately after the July 27 election, then confirmed by the
NEC in its “preliminary results” published in the first week of August, and
finally endorsed by the Constitutional Council when it rejected on August 27 all
the complaints lodged by Funcinpec and SRP.
Most political observers have predicted that such a process of publishing
controversial election results would trigger massive street protests, which the
authorities would violently repress, as in 1998. But surprisingly, this scenario
is not going to materialize. The first and major surprise, which dealt a serious
blow to observers’ predictions, was the formation earlier this month of an
unexpectedly strong and determined alliance between Funcinpec and SRP. The
Alliance of Democrats has ruled out any street demonstration because it believes
it has a more effective means to topple Prime Minister Hun Sen considered as the
symbol of a failed system. The Alliance’s strategy now centers on the grouping
of its forces in the newly elected National Assembly in order to legally push
for the selection of a new prime minister (KI, 16 August 2003, “Funcinpec
and SRP have the right to refuse Hun Sen as Prime Minister”), after
predictably tough negotiations with the CPP to ensure a quick and effective
implementation of a series of fundamental reforms, including the revision of
election laws, and an overhaul of the NEC, the Constitutional Council, the
Supreme Council of Magistracy, the National Audit Authority.
Haing Botum, Raoul Jennar, and Allen Myers (3)
Following a KI report on 13 August 2003 entitled “Haing Botum and Raoul Jennar”,
we have received the following message from one of our informants:
“You may be interested to learn and to report that the infamous Haing Botum is
not the "Belgian charlatan" Raoul Jennar but a fellow named Allen Myers, a
former Editor of the Green Left Review (also known as Direct Action) which is
the official newspaper of the Trotskyst Party of Australia.
Myers is the spouse of Helen Jarvis, an Australian librarian from New South
Wales University in Sydney, who has been working as an "Adviser" to [Hun Sen's
right hand] Sok An on the question of the Khmer Rouge Librarian. Jarvis is also
a member of the Trotskyst Party of Australia and has also worked as a research
assistant for the Soeharto regime in Indonesia.
Her job with Sok An was funded through a fraudulent scheme by which the naive
Australian government was misled to the tune of US$ 152,135 (or AUD$ 236,559).
Both Myers and Jarvis were supporters of Democratic Kampuchea until 1978 and
belonged to a group that organized a celebration on 17 April 1975 in Sydney to
commemorate the takeover of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge.
Myers lives currently in Phnom Penh and writes regularly on Cambodia for the
Green Left Review in Sydney always supporting the Hun Sen regime. He also works
with Norbert Klein in Phnom Penh, who produces "The Mirror". They are both very
active in anti-US activities in Phnom Penh.”
27 August 2003
Hun Sen’s statement about negotiation partners was
intended for rival CPP leaders (2)
On August 25, Prime Minister Hun Sen stated his refusal to negotiate with the
Alliance of Democrats (Funcinpec + SRP), which has asked for a tripartite
government with a new prime minister. He suggested that Funcinpec and SRP send
separate delegations to negotiate with a CPP delegation, which “must include Hun
Sen in any case”. In fact, Hun Sen is worried by the possible intention of some
CPP top leaders (Chea Sim, Sar Kheng, Say Chhum) to negotiate with the Alliance,
which would result in his removal from his current position. Following the
letter sent on August 23 by Prince Norodom Ranariddh on behalf of the Alliance
to CPP President Chea Sim requesting to begin negotiations to form a government,
Hun Sen has ordered his security forces to prevent Chea Sim and other CPP
leaders from contacting the Alliance.
26 August 2003
How al-Qaida recruits and trains Muslim activists from
Cambodia (3)
More and more information starts to appear in Cambodia about Jemaah Islamiyah.
This terror group is affiliated with Bin Laden’s al-Qaida. It is allegedly led
by Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali, who is accused of being involved in
preparations for the September 11, 2001, attacks in the US, and of orchestrating
last year’s deadly bomb attack in Bali as well as other terrorist attacks in
many parts of the world. Hambali has stayed in Cambodia from September 2002 to
March 2003 (The Cambodia Daily, 22 August 2003, “Hambali Left Gentle Impression
in Phnom Penh”).
According to US intelligence reports, Jemaah Islamiyah has been very active in
certain regions of Thailand. In particular, there is a special religious school
in Narathiwat province, where more than 80% of the population are Muslims and
speak Malay since the province shares its southern border with Malaysia.
Students at that school come from Burma and Cambodia exclusively; Thai students
are not accepted.
Students are selected among war orphans, whose character can be easily forged
according to the organization’s requirements. After completing an initial
program at Narathiwat province’s school, the foreign students are sent to
further their studies in Malaysia. At a final stage, they are sent to Pakistan,
where there is an appropriate training for them to become terrorists and members
of al-Qaida’s network. After completion of their training, students are sent
back to their respective countries, where they are supposed to conduct special
operations. Some of the alleged terrorists recently arrested in Cambodia, with
the cooperation of the CIA, have attended at least the Narathiwat province’s
school. The CIA also helped in the arrest of Hambali in Ayutthaya (Thailand) on
15 August 2003.
Cambodia meets all the conditions (corruption, lawlessness, poverty, ignorance)
to be a haven for terrorists as well as human and drug traffickers, whose
networks are generally intertwined.
Government-sponsored drug trafficking (3)
At the insistence of the Australian government and the US Drug Enforcement
Administration office in Bangkok, five persons have been recently arrested in
Cambodia following the seizure on April 3, 2003, in Sydney, of 24 kg of heroin
worth US$ 14.5 million hidden in a consignment of fish paste (“prohok”) imported
from Cambodia.
The five persons appeared before the Phnom Penh Municipal Tribunal on August 25.
The best known person among the suspects is Chea Tech, 57, President of
Techvimex, a trading company close to the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)
and built on the same model as the more prominent Sokimex group, which controls
a large portion of Cambodia’s economy.
Police officials have indicated that Techvimex had already been involved in the
export of marijuana but interventions from high government spheres had stopped
any investigation. The Techvimex case is reminiscent of the drug trafficking
activities of the Mong Reththy group, a conglomerate also closely associated
with the CPP and involved in the export of an exceptionally huge amount of
marijuana just before the July 5-6, 1997 coup d’état. Group President Mong
Reththy has financed a large number of schools bearing the name of Prime
Minister Hun Sen.
In the present case, the other alleged mastermind of the heroin trafficking
ring, besides Chea Tech, is Kao Van Lan, 63, an Australian citizen who is also
Vice- President of the Vietnamese Residents Association in Cambodia.
Both Sokimex President Sok Kong and Techvimex President Chea Tech are Cambodians
of Vietnamese descent.
24 August 2003
Hun Sen to return today from Vietnam
(2)
Prime Minister and CPP Vice-President Hun Sen who left for Vietnam earlier this
week (KI, 21 August 2003, “Hun Sen considers stepping down”) is to return to
Cambodia today, after a three-day visit to the neighbouring country. His
entourage has said he had to undergo a medical
check-up there. But observers have noticed that, over the last few years, any
health problems have led Hun Sen and his wife Bun Rany to either Bangkok or
Singapore.
CPP trying to buy leaders of smaller
parties (2)
The CPP seems upset by the argument developed by the Alliance of Democrats (KI,
22 August 2003, “Official launching of the Alliance of Democrats”)
stressing the fact that in spite of serious election irregularities, the former
communist ruling party collected only 47.3% of the popular votes at the last
election (KI, 12 August 2003, “A relative and questionable victory for the CPP”).
This implies that a majority of voters (52.7%) who did not vote for the CPP
apparently wanted a leadership or policy change for the country. The Alliance of
Democrats has started to use this argument to justify its demand for the removal
of current Prime Minister Hun Sen and a reform of the system he represents.
The opposition SRP and the royalist Funcinpec party respectively collected 21.9%
and 20. 7% of the votes, making a total of 42.6% for the Alliance, and leaving
10.1% to the 20 smaller parties which will not be represented at the National
Assembly.
The CPP is now reportedly trying to buy the leadership of some of the smaller
parties in order to lure them into an open alliance with the ruling party and
show public opinion that the CPP and its newly proclaimed “allies” form a bloc
that must be credited with winning a majority of the popular votes.
During their election campaign (before July 27), none of these smaller parties
had hinted they were working with or for the CPP; they rather presented
themselves as alternatives to the CPP, in the same manner as SRP or Funcinpec.
In the mind of most voters, voting for any of the 22 non-CPP parties meant
voting for a change, and any subsequent affiliation with the CPP leading to a
preservation of the status quo, would mean a betrayal of their will.
23 August 2003
Hun Sen first wanted to kill Sam Rainsy in 1994 (2)
In an article titled “Differences Buried to Form Political Alliance” published
on 20 August 2003, the Cambodia Daily wrote: “In January 1995, the Voice of
Khmer Youth reported [Prince Norodom Ranariddh] had joked about killing Sam
Rainsy at a birthday party for his wife, Princess Marie Ranariddh. The prince
later told reporters he was only joking when he said: “Soon there will be
another widow in Phnom Penh – Saumura,” referring to Sam Rainsy’s wife,
parliamentarian Tioulong Saumura”.
The missing part of the story was a visit that [then Second Prime Minister] Hun
Sen had paid to [then First Prime Minister] Prince Ranariddh at the latter’s
residence on 21 December 1994, during which the visiting guest (Hun Sen)
submitted to the host (Ranariddh) a plan that consisted in assassinating [then
Funcinpec dissident] Sam Rainsy. The visit coincidentally took place on the eve
of Princess Marie Ranariddh’s birthday. Prince Ranariddh objected to the plan on
the grounds that it would create “complications”. But the prince, who had not
been educated as a killer like Hun Sen, was a little bit shocked by the plan. He
wanted to indirectly warn Sam Rainsy whose father-in-law Nhiek Tioulong –
Saumura’s father – had succeeded (then Prince, now King) Norodom Sihanouk as
Funcinpec President until 1992. This was the reason behind his “joke”.
22 August 2003
Official launching of the Alliance of Democrats (1)
Funcinpec President Prince Norodom Ranariddh and SRP President Sam Rainsy today
signed the “Internal Rules and Organizational Structure” of the Alliance of
Democrats, which is a grouping of the two parties intended to challenge the
ruling former communist CPP. One of the aims and objectives of the Alliance is
to “merge the two political parties into one single party at an opportune
moment.” At today's meeting, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Sam Rainsy and Prince
Norodom Sirivudh were elected as the Alliance's President, First Vice-President
and Second Vice-President respectively, while Senator Ou Bun Long (SRP) will
serve as Secretary General. A “Launching Ceremony” for the Alliance will be
organized before the press on 23 August 2003.
Diplomats ending their mission in Cambodia (1)
The following diplomats or international organisations representatives will be
leaving Cambodia in the next few days or weeks:
- Japan: Ambassador Gotaro Ogawa (after 3 years in Cambodia)
- France: Ambassador André-Jean Libourel (5 years)
- UNDP: Resident Representative (Ms.) Dominique Aït Ouyahia-McAdams (4 years).
King confirms KI story about Cambodia’s two “terrible”
ladies (1)
In a 10 August 2003 message in French entitled “Drôlerie” (funny thing), King
Norodom Sihanouk recalled a conversation he had with Prime Minister Hun Sen
“more than a year ago” about two prominent Cambodian ladies, which confirms a
story first published by Khmer Intelligence on 12 September 2002 under the title
“Hun Sen complains to the King about Tioulong Saumura and Norodom Vacheara”.
More exactly, Hun Sen told the King: “If Cambodia had 20 ladies as terrible as
Princess Norodom Vacheara and Ms. Tioulong Saumura, our country would be in
trouble, just like a sinking ship”. The King replied to Hun Sen: “Your
Excellency doesn’t need and will not need to worry since we will be always short
of 9 Vachearas and 9 Saumuras to reach this figure of 20”.
21 August 2003
Hun Sen considers stepping down
(3)
Prime Minister Hun Sen held a meeting at his Tuol Krasaing residence (near
Takhmao city, in Kandal province) yesterday afternoon
(August 20). The meeting was attended by 26 CPP officials who are his
closest supporters. During the meeting intended to determine
a strategy to avoid a political deadlock following the last election, Hun Sen
stated that he would accept, in the last resort, to step down from his current
position, but on one condition: that his successor is designated by him, without
anyone having the right to oppose his choice. To succeed him, he would probably
choose his right hand Sok An, who is currently a senior Minister supervising the
extensive domain of the powerful Council of Ministers Office. Hun Sen himself
would consider becoming President of the National Assembly.
This morning, Hun Sen flew by helicopter from his Tuol Krasaing residence for a
short trip to nearby Vietnam.
Poipet’s test case for redressing election irregularities
(2)
It was in Poipet commune (in Banteay Meanchey province) that the
ruling CPP most effectively implemented its tactics to lower the voter turnout
rate at the July 27, 2003 election (KI, 15 August
2003, “CPP's victory based on deliberate measures to prevent scores of potential
voters from voting”).
Poipet,
which is
situated on
the border with Thailand, is Cambodia’s largest commune with a growing
population of around 100,000 inhabitants. It is a stronghold of the opposition
SRP, which won a majority of the popular votes at the previous parliamentary
election in 1998 and the commune council election in 2002.
The majority of the population is made up of destitute (often landless) farmers,
labourers, construction workers, small employees, porters, cart pullers, street
vendors, who live on the thriving cross-border trade. The city attracts jobless
people from all over the country.
On July 27, the CPP-organized chaos in Poipet was the worst among all Cambodia’s
1621 communes, resulting in the highest percentage of registered voters being
unable to cast their ballots and a unique decline in the citizen participation rate (see line F
on the chart below).
For countless eligible voters, the location of their polling station had been
changed without sufficient notice to a remote place difficult to find or to some
place that does not exist, such as “Khloeng” village or “Thmor Pich” village
that nobody can locate on any map.
For Banteay Meanchey province, according to a specific mathematical formula for
seat allocation (KI, 19 August 2003, “A manipulated
proportional representation system”),
the SRP needs only 1,498 more votes to get one additional parliamentary seat.
These 1,498 lacking votes represent only 0.65% of total votes cast in the whole
Banteay Meanchey province or 8.01% of total votes cast in Poipet alone. If,
without the above-described chaos, voter turnout in Poipet had been in 2003 the
same as in 2002, i.e. 61.3% instead of 46.1% (see
line E on the
chart below), there would have been more than 6,000 additional voters at the
July 27 election. These additional voters would have come mainly from the
poorest segments of the population, which constitute the bulk of SRP supporters
but were deprived of their right to vote last month.
The SRP was the only party to see an increase of its votes in Banteay Meanchey
province from 2002 to 2003 (see line J on the chart below).
Without the particular harassment inflicted on thousands of voters in Poipet,
the SRP would have probably won an additional parliamentary seat representing
Banteay Meanchey province. This is why the opposition party has asked for a
re-voting in Poipet. After a refusal by the NEC earlier this month, a final
judgment will be rendered by the Constitutional Council next week.
| ELECTIONS |
2002 |
2003 |
2002 |
2003 |
2002 |
2003 |
|
Cambodia |
Cambodia |
Banteay |
Banteay |
Poipet |
Poipet |
|
|
(local) |
(national) |
Meanchey |
Meanchey |
commune |
commune |
|
|
province |
province |
(local) |
(national) |
|||
|
(local) |
(national) |
|||||
|
A- Voting-age population |
6,230,314 |
6,749,876 |
326,542 |
347,803 |
40,000 (*) |
45,000 (*) |
|
B- Registered voters |
5,190,307 |
6,341,834 |
251,226 |
307,811 |
29,678 |
40,561 |
| C- Voter registration rate (B/A) | 83.3% | 93.9% | 77.0% | 88.5% | 74.2% | 90.1% |
|
D- Actual voters (total votes) |
4,543,974 |
5,277,494 |
209,039 |
228,440 |
18,197 |
18,694 |
|
E- Voter turnout rate (D/B) |
87.5% |
83.2% |
83.2% |
74.2% |
61.3% |
46.1% |
| F- Citizen participation rate (D/A) | 72.9% | 78.2% | 64.0% | 65.7% | 45.5% | 41.5% |
|
G- Null and void votes |
171,261 |
108,657 |
10,602 |
4,263 |
612 |
324 |
| H- Valid votes (D-G = I+J+K+L) |
4,372,713 |
5,168,837 |
198,437 |
224,177 |
17,585 |
18,370 |
|
I- CPP votes |
2,674,303 |
2,447,259 |
117,716 |
106,655 |
6,429 |
7,255 |
|
J- SRP votes |
731,150 |
1,130,423 |
35,512 |
51,831 |
7,881 |
6,670 |
|
K- Funcinpec votes |
958,326 |
1,072,313 |
45,112 |
43,535 |
3,275 |
2,952 |
|
L- Other (smaller) parties votes |
8,934 |
518,842 |
97 |
22,156 |
0 |
1,493 |
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(*) Estimates that better reflect the real voting-age population of Poipet. Official figures provided by the police (33,030 for 2002, and 36,289 for 2003) obviously underestimate the real voting-age population, as evidenced by the number of citizens registered as voters by the NEC in January-February 2003 (40,561), which is noticeably larger than the figure for the corresponding voting-age population given by the police (36,289).
19 August 2003
A subtle form
of cheating during the ballot counting process
(2)
A subtle form of election cheating could have taken place during the ballot
counting process, which started one day after polling day on July 27, 2003. The
rules and regulations of the National Election Committee (NEC) state that the
tally sheet, Form 1105, must be given to political party agents immediately
after the counting process is completed, meaning normally before the end of the
day on July 28. But this was not put into practice in numerous provinces and
polling stations, where the tally sheets, at best, were given only very late in
the night of July 28; some had even been withheld for several days after the
deadline. It is too late now to do anything about it since there is a serious
possibility that the ballots could have been manipulated during that period of
time when party agents and independent election observers were not present, with
the corresponding tally sheets given after the deadline containing figures which
had also been manipulated.
A manipulated proportional representation system (2)
Parliamentary elections in Cambodia are supposed to be based on a proportional
representation system. But the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and its
electoral arm, the National Election Committee (NEC), have manipulated the
election system through discretionary changes in mathematical formulas used for
parliamentary seat allocation (KI, 26 March 2003, “Controversial election expert
to be hired by UNDP”) , discriminatory measures to exclude a large number of
citizens from the election process (KI, 15 August 2003, “CPP's victory based on
deliberate measures to prevent
scores of potential voters from voting”), ballot
tampering (KI, August 19, “A subtle form of cheating during the ballot counting
process”), and refusal to conduct ballot recounting (KI, 15 August 2003, “Stunning
refusal by the NEC to conduct ballot recounting”), all this being done in
such a way so as to seriously distort the will of the people and the spirit of
proportional representation.
In the end, as shown in the chart below, the CPP manages to get a seat at the National Assembly with only 33,524 votes on average, whereas for a same seat Funcinpec needs 41,242 votes (23% more), and the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) must collect 47,100 votes (40% more). Under these circumstances, it is rather surprising and disturbing to hear international election observers declare Cambodia’s last election “free and fair”.
|
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SEAT ALLOCATION IN 2003 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Political parties |
CPP |
Funcinpec |
SRP |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A- Number of votes collected (*) |
2,447,259 |
1,072,313 |
1,130,423 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
B- Number of seats allocated (**) |
73 |
26 |
24 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
C- Number of votes per seat (A/B) |
33,524 |
41,242 |
47,100 |
|
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(*) Official preliminary results published by the NEC.
(**) Unofficial calculation using the latest formula for seat allocation adopted
by the NEC.
16 August 2003
Funcinpec and SRP have the right to
refuse Hun Sen as Prime Minister (2)
Following the July 27 election, some analysts argue that Funcinpec and SRP are
behaving like bad losers by blocking the formation of a new government. They
claim that the new government must be led by Hun Sen since he has been
designated as candidate for Prime Minister by the CPP, which has won the
election. To counter these arguments, the following remarks can be made:
- In 1993, the CPP lost the UN-organized election. Having obtained only 51 seats
at the National Assembly, they imposed on Funcinpec, which had won the election,
the constitutional requirement for any government to have the support of a
two-third majority of the National Assembly, thus leading to an unusual
power-sharing scheme with the appointment of two Prime Ministers!
In 2003, the CPP won a majority of the popular votes but the Alliance of
Democrats (Funcinpec + SRP) has secured at least 50 seats at the National
Assembly, a score very similar to the one achieved by the CPP in 1993.
Therefore, following the same rules of the game established ten years ago, the
Alliance of Democrats should be able to negotiate with the CPP a power-sharing
scheme similar to the one agreed upon by all parties in 1993.
- As the “winning party”, the CPP has the right to designate Mr. Hun Sen (or
anybody else) as their candidate for Prime Minister, but the Alliance of
Democrats has the right to vote or not to vote for that candidate when a secret
ballot is organized at the National Assembly, as stipulated in the Constitution.
If their first candidate fails (maybe twice successively) to gather two thirds
of the votes, then the CPP will have to designate another candidate if they want
to avoid a stalemate. In ancient Rome, when Emperor Caligula wanted to appoint
his horse as a Senator, many decent people legitimately objected to his plan.
Hun Sen needs to buy 14
parliamentarians from Funcinpec and/or SRP (2)
According to official provisional results of the July 27 legislative election
proclaimed by the NEC, the CPP has obtained 73 seats at the new National
Assembly, which is made up of 123 members. Therefore, in the well-known plan for
Hun Sen to be elected Prime Minister for another 5-year term, the CPP needs to
secure the support of 9 parliamentarians from Funcinpec and/or SRP in order to
obtain a two-third majority of 82 parliamentarians, as required by the
Constitution.
But according to the National Assembly internal regulations, there is an even
more stringent requirement represented by a quorum of seven tenths, meaning that
out of the 123 Assembly members, at least 87 (the figure of 86.1 must be round
up) must be physically present for any
parliamentary session to proceed legally. In other words, in
order to cope with a possible boycott by Funcinpec and SRP, the CPP must buy at
least 14 parliamentarians from the two other parties represented in Parliament
to be able to convene the new National Assembly and proceed with the election of
Hun Sen as Prime Minister. This scenario is very unlikely to materialize with
the strengthening of the Alliance of Democrats that has been forged between
Funcinpec and SRP in order to legally topple Hun Sen.
15 August 2003
CPP's victory based on deliberate
measures to prevent scores of
potential voters from voting (2)
As shown in our chart comparing the results of the last four elections in
Cambodia (KI, 12 August 2003, “A relative and questionable victory for the CPP”),
the ruling party gains determining advantage in preventing scores
of eligible voters from voting. Actually, the lower the voter turnout rate, the
better the result for Prime Minister Hun Sen’s party.
The ruling CPP, which tightly controls the population throughout the country
through communist-type cells represented by groups of ten houses/families
overseen by devoted village chiefs, can easily mobilize its supporters to go to
vote by providing them with all kind of facilities, while the other political
parties have more difficulty in identifying and mobilizing their supporters, who
are more scattered and more afraid to reveal their political preference.
Although the CPP claims to currently have 4 million members, the actual number
of their more or less voluntary supporters does not exceed 2.5 million, which
amounts to only 36% of the 6.80 million people representing the total number of
citizens with the right to vote (over 18 year-old). Therefore, in order to
obtain a higher percentage of the popular votes at any elections, the CPP must
prevent as many non-CPP supporters as possible from casting their ballot. The
non-CPP supporters are identified and targeted by their village chiefs, who use
monitoring and spying methods commonly used in communist countries where the
ruling party has the State apparatus at its disposal.
Over the last ten years, voter turnout rates have steadily dropped from 96% to
83 %, thus allowing the CPP to continuously secure a majority of the popular
votes in subtly manipulated elections and to remain in power until now.
At the last July 27, 2003 election, it has been reported that
organized chaos was put into full force when many voters turned up only to find
that their polling station had been moved to another location.
Not able to find the right polling station, they were discouraged and went home
without voting.
In other instances, potential voters with all their ID cards and voters cards in
order found that their names had just simply been crossed out. They were told
that they had “already voted” and were prevented from casting their ballot.
In yet still other instances, village chiefs and commune heads, using
intimidation or bribe, had collected voting cards
or ID cards,
which were never returned to their legitimate owners. The concerned eligible
voters were therefore forced to give up their voting right.
It must also be noted here that 63% of the adult population in Cambodia are
illiterate, which means that
hundreds of thousands of people cannot read a voters list and
were not able to find their names. There are reports stating that CPP-appointed
election officers in no way helped voters who were trying to vote. On the
contrary,
they just sent them back to the lists posted outside the polling station, thus
causing utter confusion. In the end, the concerned eligible voters became
discouraged and went home without voting.
Normally, election officers are under the obligation to help the voters, and not
hinder the process. Receiving special treatment, CPP supporters were given a
slip of paper by their village chief containing the voter’s name and
registration number, and were able to go through the process smoothly, with no
hassle.
Unfortunately, most
international election observers failed to observe the above-described subtle
methods used by the CPP to manipulate the 2003
parliamentary election, which they hastily declared “free and fair”.
Stunning refusal by the NEC to
conduct ballot recounting (2)
In any democratic elections, when one candidate or competing party wins over the
other(s) by an extremely small margin (generally less than 0.5%) after the first
ballot counting, a ballot recounting is ordered automatically, without anybody
having to ask for it. But for the July 27, 2003 parliamentary election in
Cambodia, the CPP-controlled National Election Committee (NEC) has adamantly
refused to comply with this principle, which is based on the recognition of the
fact that a small human error with far-reaching implications is always possible,
even without intentional malice.
For instance,
in
Svay Rieng province, the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) needs only 146 more
votes (or 0.06% of a total of 231,859 valid votes) to get one parliamentary
seat. And in Kompong Thom province, the SRP needs only 375 more votes (or 0.16 %
of a total of 233,286 valid votes) to win an additional seat at the National
Assembly. In spite (or because) of alleged irregularities in the initial ballot
counting, the NEC asserts that there is no need to conduct any recounting. In a
few days, the NEC’s stunning decision will likely be endorsed by the CPP-controlled
Constitutional Council, which acts as an appeal court for election disputes.
Will international election observers maintain that the 2003 election in
Cambodia was “free and fair”?
13 August 2003
The CPP took US$ 40 million from government funds to
finance its election campaign (2)
Figures published this month by the Finance Ministry related to the
implementation of the State budget for 2003 show that the Hun Sen government
earlier this year borrowed US$ 40 million from the National Bank of Cambodia and
private banks to finance the CPP election campaign prior to the July 27, 2003
poll. The IMF office in Phnom Penh, which is supposed to monitor the government
fiscal and monetary policy, has not reacted yet to this unorthodox and
inflationary way of financing a most controversial spending by the current
Cambodian government, whose survival heavily depends on international financial
assistance.
Haing Botum and Raoul Jennar (3)
Over the last few weeks, many persons interested in developments in Cambodia
have received a series of e-mails from a person who calls himself Haing Botum.
The pro-CPP arguments developed by Haing Botum are exactly the same as the ones
developed by Raoul Jennar, a controversial Belgian self-proclaimed expert on
Cambodian affairs, who used to publish his writings defending the Hun Sen regime
in the aftermath of the 1998 election in a pro-CPP Phnom Penh-based newspaper
called “The Vision” (KI, 8 August 2003). But “The Vision” has ceased to exist
after its editor was prosecuted a few years ago for blackmail and forgery.
12 August 2003
A relative and questionable victory for the CPP (2)
The ruling former communist Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) apparently won the
July 27, 2003 national election. But an in-depth analysis based on detailed
figures covering the last four elections in Cambodia (see chart below) shows
that the CPP, in spite of the questionable methods it has been using to control
the election process, is in fact losing ground.
Even after cleverly preventing some 1.5 million citizens with the right to vote from
actually exercising their right to vote through political discrimination during
the voter registration process in January-February 2003 and organized chaos on
July 27, 2003 (see lines F and G on the chart), leading to the lowest voter
turnout ever (line E), the CPP’s share of the popular votes dropped from 61.2%
in 2002 to 47.3% in 2003 (line J).
The CPP claims for itself the right to govern the country with an iron fist even
though the number of its voters represents only 36.3% of the adult population with
the right to vote (line K). Measured that way, the level of popular support for
the CPP has remained remarkably stable and relatively low over the last ten
years, irrespective of its controversial elections methods based on voter
intimidation, vote buying, and ballot tampering (line K).
Most international election observers have failed to pay due attention to some
of the most recent and most subtle forms of election manipulation used by the
CPP to distort the will of the Cambodian people. At the 2003 election, the CPP
made full use of the State apparatus under its control (from the Ministry of
Interior to village chiefs) to ultimately exclude a significantly large number
of potential voters from the election process whenever those potential voters
were suspected of sympathy for any party other than the CPP, as reported by
their village chiefs.
Most young voters (between 18 and 25), especially first-time voters did not vote
for the CPP at the last election, as indicated by figures on the chart below.
From 2002 to 2003, the number of citizens registered on voter lists increased by
1.15 million, representing mainly first-time eligible voters (line B). But the
number of actual voters increased by only 0.74 million because of the organized
chaos on voting day (line D), while the number of valid votes increased by 0.8
million (line H).
The different political parties did not benefit evenly from the increase in the
number of voters from 2002 to 2003. The CPP saw the number of its voters
decrease by 0.22 million (line I), reflecting its declining trend. Funcinpec
made a slight gain of 0.11 million voters (line L). At the same time, an
additional 0.40 million people voted for the SRP, which appears as the main
winner of this election (lines O and P). The 20 other, smaller and mostly
newly-formed parties collected an additional 0.51 million votes (line R). In any
case, all the votes for non-CPP parties (52.7% of valid votes) indicate that a
majority of the electorate wants a regime change or, at least, a change in the
country’s leadership.
| ELECTIONS | 1993 | 1998 | 2002 | 2003 |
| (national) | (national) | (local) | (national) | |
| In million unless otherwise specified | ||||
| A- Citizens with the right to vote (18+) | 4.50 | 5.49 | 6.23 | 6.75 |
| B- Citizens registered on voter lists | 4.25 (*) | 5.40 | 5.19 | 6.34 |
| C- Voter registration rate (B/A) | 94% (*) | 98% | 83% | 93% |
| D- Actual voters (number of votes) | 4.10 | 5.06 | 4.54 | 5.28 |
| E- Voter turnout (D/B) | 96% | 94% | 87% | 83% |
| F- Citizens prevented from voting (A-D) | 0.40 | 0.43 | 1.69 | 1.47 |
| G- Citizens discarded in % of total citizens (F/A) | 8.9% | 7.8% | 27.1% | 21.8% |
| H- Valid votes | 4.01 | 4.90 | 4.37 | 5.17 |
| I- Votes for CPP in million | 1.53 | 2.03 | 2.67 (**) | 2.45 |
| J- Votes for CPP in % of valid votes (I/H) | 38.2% | 41.4% | 61.2% (**) | 47.3% |
| K- Votes for CPP in % of total citizens (I/A) | 34.0% | 37.0% | 42.9% (**) | 36.3% |
| L- Votes for Funcinpec (FCP) in million | 1.82 | 1.55 | 0.96 | 1.07 |
| M- Votes for FCP in % of valid votes (L/H) | 45.4% | 31.7% | 21.9% | 20.7% |
| N- Votes for FCP in % of total citizens (L/A) | 40.4% | 28.3% | 15.4% | 15.9% |
| O- Votes for Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) in million | (***) | 0.70 | 0.73 | 1.13 |
| P- Votes for SRP in % of valid votes (O/H) | (***) | 14.3% | 16.7% | 21.9% |
| Q- Votes for SRP in % of total citizens (O/A) | (***) | 12.7% | 11.7% | 16.7% |
| R- Votes for other (smaller) parties in million (****) | 0.66 | 0.62 | 0.01 | 0.52 |
| S- Votes for other parties in % of valid votes (R/H) | 16.4% | 12.6% | 0.2% | 10.1% |
| T- Votes for other parties in % of total citizens (R/A) | 14.7% | 11.3% | 0.2% | 7.7% |
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(*) In 1993, UNTAC was unable to
register a portion of the population living in Khmer Rouge zones.
(**) In 2002, the CPP resorted to a massive and systematic vote-buying on the
eve of voting day, during the “Night of the Barking Dogs” ("Riatrei
Chhkae Pruh").
(***) Non applicable. In 1993, Sam Rainsy was a Funcinpec
member.
The SRP was founded only in 1995.
(****) Number of other (smaller) political parties taking part in the election:
in 1993: 18; in 1998: 36; in 2002: 8; in 2003: 20.
Sources: United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), National Election Committee
(NEC), political parties (CPP, Funcinpec, SRP).
8 August 2003
King Sihanouk distances himself from
Funcinpec (1)
On 6 August 2003, the Royal Palace issued a hand-written message dated
the same day from King Norodom Sihanouk under the headline:
Annotation of His Majesty Norodom Sihanouk on an article of Cambodge Soir,
Tuesday, 5 August 2003, entitled “Funcinpec: The Reasons of a Failure”.
The King reacted to views expressed by Raoul Jennar, a self-proclaimed expert on
Cambodia, who is known for his sympathy for the Hun
Sen regime. The controversial Belgian NGO worker had insulted the King several
times in the past. Last year, he reportedly and unsuccessfully tried to
negotiate a position as adviser to CPP Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong.
The King wrote: “Mr. Raoul Jennar has always hated me.
But the Cambodian people are well aware that the Funcinpec is not King Sihanouk.
Our People judge our Monarchy through my acts, my private life, the services I
render every day, every week, every month, every year, to the Fatherland, the
People, the Nation, the Religion (and Queen Monineath with me), and not through
the Funcinpec, its Princes and Princesses.”
Original version in French: “M. Raoul Jennar m’a toujours
détesté. Or le Peuple cambodgien sait bien que le Funcinpec n’est pas le Roi
Sihanouk. Notre Peuple juge notre Monarchie à travers mes actes, ma vie privée,
les services que je rends chaque jour, chaque semaine, chaque mois, chaque année
à la Patrie, au Peuple, à la Nation, à la Religion (et la Reine Monineath avec
moi) et non pas à travers le Funcinpec, ses Princes et ses Princesses. ”
6 August 2003
Funcinpec and Sam Rainsy Party join forces at the
grassroots level (1)
Funcinpec Secretary General Prince Norodom Sirivudh and
SRP Secretary General Eng Chhay Eang signed today a joint instruction to commune
council members of their respective parties, asking them “to closely cooperate
in order to serve the people at the grassroots level, in particular to join
forces to ensure the security of members of the two parties.” Furthermore, local
leaders from the two parties “must show determination and courage in order to
counter intimidation from other people, while avoiding verbal attacks and
provocations that could lead to violence.”
This joint instruction is a concrete result of the
Cooperation Agreement signed on August 4, 2003 by Prince Norodom Ranariddh and
Sam Rainsy, launching the “Alliance of Democrats” to counter the ruling former
communist Cambodian People’s Party (CPP).
At the February 3, 2002 commune council election, Funcinpec and SRP won commune
chief positions for only 10 and 13 communes respectively, out of a total of
1,621 communes. But if their commune council members join hands now, they can
take the control of some 250 communes, many of which are large communes in urban
areas.
Following the July 27, 2003 parliamentary election, SRP has become the number
one party in 145 communes (including 56 in Phnom Penh), and Funcinpec is the
strongest party in 92 communes. The Alliance of Democrats has more popular
support than the CPP in 557 communes.
3rd Quarter 2002 4th Quarter 2002 1st Quarter 2003 2nd Quarter 2003 3rd Quarter 2003 4th Quarter 2003 1st Quarter 2004 2nd Quarter 2004 3rd Quarter 2004 4th Quarter 2004 1st Quarter 2005 2nd Quarter 2005 3rd Quarter 2005