KHMER INTELLIGENCE

Khmer Intelligence (KI) is a non-government organisation whose objective is to collect sensitive information from non-easily accessible sources to help Khmer and foreign observers better follow and understand the situation in Cambodia. KI finds out what is behind the latest news and news to come. For security reasons KI must preserve anonymity for its informants. Information is classified according to five levels of reliability: Official or Semi-Official (1), Very Reliable (2), Reliable (3), Insistent Rumour (4), Rumour (5).
News compiled by KI are posted on www.khmerintelligence.org
For any further information, please contact samngat@khmerintelligence.org
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29 September 2003

CPP plot to mislead the King into going to the Assembly (2)
The opening of the National Assembly on September 27 looked like a farce because King Norodom Sihanouk reportedly changed his mind twice before finally deciding not to preside over the ceremony (KI, 27 September 2003: “National Assembly fails to legally meet”). In fact, there was a CPP plot to mislead the King into presiding over the Assembly’s inaugural session.
It was a tumultuous day. At 9:30 a.m. Royal Palace Minister Kong Sam Ol (from the CPP) told the King that opposition leader Sam Rainsy had changed his mind and finally decided to attend the ceremony. The King then, in line with his promise to go to the Assembly only in the presence of parliamentarians from the three parties, accepted to preside over the ceremony in person. He was going to leave the Royal Palace slightly before 10:00 a.m. when he received a handwritten message from Sam Rainsy saying the opposition was maintaining its boycott. The King then got off his car and announced he would definitely not go to the Assembly.
Yesterday, Sam Rainsy told the King he had never changed his mind on the subject. When pressed to elaborate on the source of his misleading information, Kong Sam Ol this morning wrote the King a letter saying he learned about Sam Rainsy’s alleged plan (“to attend the ceremony”) from Sok An and Sar Kheng, respectively CPP Minister at the Office of the Council of Ministers, and CPP Minister of Interior, who themselves claimed to have obtained the false information from a radio station named FM 102. But this afternoon, the director of FM 102 Radio issued a statement denying having collected, communicated or broadcast such information on September 27.
It is clear that the CPP did make a desperate attempt to lure the King into the Assembly to preside over (i.e. endorse) a controversial inauguration.     

28 September 2003    7:00 p.m. Phnom Penh time

Cambodia with no legitimate government at ASEAN summit (1)
At the forthcoming ASEAN summit meeting to take place in Bali (Indonesia) on 7-8 October 2003, the Cambodian delegation headed by Hun Sen will be given a special and embarrassing status since Cambodia has no legitimate government after the controversial opening of the new National Assembly on September 27. The current government is now perceived by many as illegitimate since it was formed from the old Assembly, which has ceased to exist, while the new Assembly is unable to meet properly and has yet to endorse a new government in line with the Constitution. The current government has become, at best, a caretaker government that cannot commit the country as before September 27. No new and legitimate government is expected to be formed at least several days or weeks after the swearing-in ceremony at the Royal Palace on October 4 (KI, 27 September 2003: “King summons parliamentarians from the three parties”).

Financial crisis looming (2)
A financial crisis is looming in Cambodia, with far-reaching implications that will have to be faced by the current caretaker government if it is going to last for some time. International financial institutions (World Bank, ADB, IMF) and donor countries are reassessing the political situation from a legal point of view in order not to unduly commit themselves. Foreign investors are holding back with increased caution because of the political uncertainty. Corruption, already rampant with devastating effects, is worsening with the wait-and-see and free-for-all attitude of government employees in general and tax collectors in particular. State revenues, in particular custom duties, have started to decline. The government is increasingly cash-strapped, being obliged to delay the payment of salaries for many State employees, with priority given to policemen, soldiers and teachers (in that order, to avoid political instability and social unrest). Many public and social services, especially those related to health, public works and justice, have to be neglected.           

27 September 2003

7:00 p.m. Phnom Penh time

King summons parliamentarians from the three parties (1)
In a royal message to the nation issued this afternoon, the King invites the 123 newly elected National Assembly members from the three major political parties (CPP, Funcinpec, SRP) to the Royal Palace for a solemn swearing-in ceremony on Saturday, 4 October 2003. The ceremony will start at 5:00 p.m. and will be followed by a dinner offered by the monarch. The King specifies in his message that even if one or two parties decide not to positively respond to his invitation, he will still preside over the swearing-in ceremony and maintain the dinner. In fact, according to our information, the three parties have already (i.e. immediately) accepted the royal invitation.
Negotiations between the three parties to break the current political deadlock are expected to start under the auspices of the monarch after their October 4 meeting.        

11:00 a.m. Phnom Penh time

National Assembly fails to legally meet (1)
As we announced yesterday (KI, 26 September 2003: “No National Assembly members from Funcinpec and SRP will attend tomorrow’s official meeting”), only 73 newly elected parliamentarians from the CPP showed up earlier this morning at what was supposed to be an inauguration of the National Assembly’s third legislature. Until the last minute, the CPP circulated rumors that the King would come to preside over the ceremony. Those rumors, which caused a delay coupled with impromptu and burlesque changes in the protocol, proved to be wrong. Eventually, the ceremony took place under the chairmanship of CCP President Chea Sim, who simply made a 10-minute speech. In total, the ceremony lasted no longer than 15 minutes. The parliamentarians present did not swear in. Only some photos were taken.  CPP top officials (Chea Sim, Hun Sen, Heng Samrin) seemed to be embarrassed by the way the ceremony had to be conducted, and they did not make any statement before quickly leaving the Assembly compound.

26 September 2003

No National Assembly members from Funcinpec and SRP will attend tomorrow’s official meeting (2)
Implementing a long-announced resolution of the Alliance of Democrats, neither Funcinpec nor Sam Rainsy Party will send their newly elected National Assembly members to the inauguration of the National Assembly’s third term scheduled for tomorrow morning.
The 50 parliamentarians from the two Alliance parties will instead meet and spend the whole morning at Prince Norodom Ranariddh’s residence (for Funcinpec MPs) or at the Sam Rainsy Party headquarters (for SRP MPs).
Only the 73 newly elected parliamentarians from the CPP are expected to attend tomorrow’s official meeting at the National Assembly.   

Prince Ranariddh complains about French ambassador’s attitude (2)
Funcinpec President Prince Norodom Ranariddh wrote last week to France’s Foreign Affairs Minister Dominique de Villepin to complain about the attitude of the French Ambassador in Cambodia, André-Jean Libourel, whom Ranariddh accuses of being biased toward Prime Minister Hun Sen’s CPP. Next month, Libourel will definitively leave Cambodia, ending a five-year mission. 

Cambodian MP meets with Italian government official (1)
On 22 September 2003, Member of Parliament Tioulong Saumura from the Sam Rainsy Party, who is also Deputy Secretary-General of the Alliance of Democrats, went to Rome to meet with Ms. Margherita Boniver, Italy’s Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in charge of Asia and Human Rights. Italy currently holds the presidency of the European Union.

25 September 2003

1,000 policemen to intimidate MPs (2)
The Interior Ministry has just sent a letter to National Assembly Secretary-General Kol Pheng informing him that 500 policemen will be deployed in the National Assembly compound on 27 September in order to “ensure security” for the newly elected parliamentarians who will be holding on that day the inaugural session of the Assembly’s third legislature. The letter specifies that 500 additional policemen will be stationed outside the Assembly compound, in a way so as to surround the Assembly building in order to “protect Members of Parliament from external danger”. 

US Senate Majority Leader expresses concern for the safety of political opponents (1)
On September 24, US Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist declared in a public statement: “The situation in Cambodia is growing cause for concern. We applaud the courage and determination of the democratic opposition to chart a new course for that country, but we remain gravely concerned for their safety.” Senate Majority Whip Mitch McConnel added to the above statement: “Unfortunately, some senior leaders in the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) have a penchant for violence and intimidation.”  

23 September 2003

CPP rejects latest SRP proposal (1)
This afternoon, on behalf of the ruling CPP, Prime Minister Hun Sen rejected the latest proposal made by the opposition SRP in order to ensure the participation of the 50 MPs elect from the Alliance of Democrats (Funcinpec + SRP) in the inaugural ceremony of the new National Assembly scheduled for 27 September (KI, 22 September 2003: “Opposition makes concession to break political deadlock”).
Therefore, only the 73 MPs elect from the CPP will attend the ceremony. There are 4 to 8 renegade MPs elect from Funcinpec and/or SRP who could also join the controversial meeting. The quorum for any working meeting of the National Assembly to proceed legally is 87. 

22 September 2003

China and Vietnam reassessing the situation in Cambodia (3)
China and Vietnam are reassessing the situation in Cambodia in light of the present political deadlock and are starting to examine the possibility of a sidelining of current Prime Minister Hun Sen. The two Asian communist countries are starting to seek assurances that any new Cambodian leaders pay due attention to what Beijing and Hanoi consider their fundamental interests.
- For China: respect for the “one-China policy”, and no Khmer Rouge tribunal that would expose China’s support for the genocidal Pol Pot regime in 1975-1979.
- For Vietnam: no revision of border treaties signed with Cambodia in the 1980’s, and no tolerance for political refugees from Vietnam that could create instability for that country. 

Opposition makes concession to break political deadlock (1)
Following a three-hour meeting of top leaders of the Alliance of Democrats, the opposition Sam Rainsy Party issued today a statement outlining its “ultimate concession for the sake of the nation”. The statement reads: “We now amend our demand for a vote recounting for the provinces of Svay Rieng and Kompong Thom. The recounting could now be carried out after [the inauguration of the new National Assembly scheduled for] 27 September, provided the two contested parliamentary seats are suspended in the meantime from the two CPP MPs declared elected for the two provinces by the National Election Committee. (...). If the CPP responds positively to our ultimate concession, 121 MPs from the three political parties will attend the 27 September ceremony, fulfilling the wishes of His Majesty the King.” (KI, 15 September 2003: “CPP promptly reacts to King Sihanouk’s intention not to inaugurate the new National Assembly”).      

21 September 2003

Many diplomats are revising their assessment of Cambodia’s political situation (2)
Given the political deadlock facing Cambodia since the July 27 election, diplomats here realize that with each passing day:
1- The current government loses a bit of its legitimacy, which will totally disappear after September 27 if the new National Assembly cannot be convened according to the terms of the Constitution;
- The Alliance of Democrats (Funcinpec + SRP) gains more and more credibility, while there was a lot of skepticism about its durability immediately following its creation in early August;
- The ruling CPP faces increasingly serious internal problems relative to the maintenance of Mr. Hun Sen as the sole candidate for prime minister, since the Alliance of Democrats adamantly demands a new prime minister, who could acceptably be CPP President Chea Sim. 

Hun Sen wants to force Chea Sim to resign from his newly won MP position (3)
On September 20, CPP Royal Palace Minister Kong Sam Ol went to see CPP President Chea Sim to tell him that Queen Monineath Sihanouk had suggested -- implicitly with the approbation of King Norodom Sihanouk -- that he (Chea Sim) should resign from his newly won position of National Assembly member (he was the CPP top-of-the-list candidate for Phnom Penh) if he wants to properly represent the King at the inauguration ceremony of the new National Assembly on September 27, when he would inadequately be only a “primus inter pares” without prior resignation.
In fact, the Queen had never asked Kong Sam Ol to make such a suggestion to Chea Sim. Kong Sam Ol disgracefully took the initiative himself under the instructions of Prime Minister and CPP Vice-President Hun Sen. The latter wants Chea Sim to give up his MP position because, according to Article 100 of the Constitution, a prime minister must be a National Assembly member, and he (Hun Sen) wants to eliminate Chea Sim as a rival in the competition for the position of prime minister.
This is not the first time that Kong Sam Ol fraudulently and deceitfully uses the names of the King and/or the Queen. On September 15, Kong Sam Ol fraudulently and deceitfully used the name of the King to convene the new National Assembly on September 27 (KI, 15 September 2003: “CPP promptly reacts to King Sihanouk’s intention not to inaugurate the new National Assembly”). 

National Assembly or CPP Assembly? (2)
Under the present circumstances, the 50 newly elected parliamentarians from Funcinpec and SRP will boycott the inauguration ceremony of the new National Assembly scheduled by the CPP for September 27. Therefore, only 73 parliamentarians from the CPP will take part in the ceremony, which will be presided over by CPP President Chea Sim -- himself a newly elected Assembly member -- while the voluntarily absent King has decided not to send any congratulations or best wishes message to this “half Assembly”.
The question that many people now ask is whether such a ceremony is legally valid or means anything. Article 76 of the Constitution states: “The National Assembly is composed of at least 120 representatives of the people.”  Article 82 requires that the first session of the National Assembly be personally convened by the King, who has traditionally up to now presided over the inauguration ceremony in person. In this spirit, the inauguration ceremony is intended to officially give birth to a new body, which must be composed of at least 120 members to be complete and duly constituted.
Some leaders of the Alliance of Democrats claim that the traditional and official ceremony of proclamation of the new Assembly by the King is comparable to the delivery of a baby, with the King acting as a midwife. They ask the following questions: Can anybody deliver only half a baby and claim that the other half will come later? Can any legal body be declared duly formed when half of its legal components is missing? Is such a baby or new legal body viable? Can the “midwife” be proud of helping deliver such a baby, who looks like a monster with only one leg, one arm, and one eye?
Actually, the 73 Assembly members from the CPP exclusively who will gather on September 27 will not form a “National Assembly”, but a “CPP Assembly”. This partisan Assembly should not meet at the National Assembly building, but at the CPP headquarters in the district of Chamcar Mon, near Chea Sim’s residence.          

19 September 2003

 A coup d’état may be under way (3)
Because of the King’s decision not to open himself the National Assembly’s third term and to designate CPP President Chea Sim to represent him instead (see the King’s message to the nation issued today in which he stated he would not be bullied by certain elements of the ruling party), a CPP faction led by Hun Sen may stage a coup d’état in the next few days in order to force the leaders of Funcinpec and SRP to attend the ceremony scheduled for 27 September, so that the King would have no more reasons to refuse to preside over the ceremony.

18 September 2003

National Assembly unlikely to meet on 27 September (2)
In spite of intensive efforts by the CPP to make the King change his mind about not presiding over the opening ceremony of the third term of the National Assembly on 27 September (KI, 16 September 2003: “King’s message confirms CPP’s fraudulent attempt to convene the National Assembly”), the likelihood of such an event taking place at that date is minimum.
On 17 September, Funcinpec President Prince Norodom Ranariddh, who is also President of the Alliance of Democrats, wrote to inform the monarch that the 26 Funcinpec newly elected parliamentarians would attend the scheduled ceremony if there will be at least 120 representatives of the people taking part in that first session of the new Assembly, in accordance with article 76 of the Constitution.
Since opposition leader Sam Rainsy has informed the King that the 24 SRP newly elected parliamentarians would not attend the ceremony (KI, 15 September 2003: “CPP promptly reacts to King Sihanouk’s intention not to inaugurate the new National Assembly”), therefore bringing down the number of parliamentarians present at a possible inauguration meeting to a maximum of 99 (123 minus 24), Funcinpec Assembly members consistently will not join the meeting.
In September 1998, before an agreement under the auspices of the King was reached by the same three major political parties to unanimously attend a similar inauguration ceremony at the King’s residence in Siem Reap city, the late CPP Justice Minister Chem Snguon asked the King to open the second term of the National Assembly on 24 September 1998 even without the participation of Members of Parliament from the other two parties (Funcinpec and SRP), meaning that the King would have to preside over an inauguration ceremony attended by only 64 parliamentarians (out of 122) all from the CPP. The King’s reply was: “I cannot open only half of our National Assembly because I am the King of all Cambodians.”

16 September 2003

King’s message confirms CPP’s fraudulent attempt to convene the National Assembly (2)
Following his yesterday’s letter to opposition leader Sam Rainsy announcing that he would be unable to open the Parliament at the end of this month because of a boycott by the SRP (KI, 15 September 2003: “CPP promptly reacts to King Sihanouk’s intention not to inaugurate the new National Assembly”), King Norodom Sihanouk issued this morning a message to the Cambodian people confirming his refusal to open the third parliamentary session that was tentatively scheduled for “25, or 26, or 27 September 2003”.
This morning’s message from the monarch confirms that the letter hastily written and signed last night by Royal Palace Minister Kong Sam Ol was a ploy by the CPP, which fraudulently used the name and the authority of the king to try to lure newly elected or re-elected parliamentarians from Funcinpec and SRP into an inaugural session of the National Assembly that – according to Kong Sam Ol’s misleading letter – would be definitely held on 27 September and presided over by the king in person.
On 18 September 1998, King Norodom Sihanouk, following the Constitution, wrote and signed himself a letter to each newly elected parliamentarian to convene them to an inaugural meeting of the National Assembly to be presided over by the monarch in person. The meeting took place on 24 September at the Royal Residence in Siem Reap city, with the participation of all the 122 parliamentarians, and was immediately followed by a swearing-in ceremony in front of Angkor Wat temples.

Impact on the country of a delay in convening the National Assembly (2)
To the question whether his party’s boycott of the Assembly – if its demand for a ballot recounting is not accepted by the CPP – would cause additional hardship to the Cambodian people, opposition leader Sam Rainsy provided a kind of answer in his 15 September 2003 letter to the King, in which he asserts that several more days needed for ballot recounting would not create more difficulties for the people, since they are already suffering intensely given a worsening poverty, a continuous deforestation, successive ecological disasters, food shortage, land grab, massive joblessness, derelict public and social services, appalling record of increasing illiteracy, crime and mortality, in a country that is dying slowly. “Neither the reconvening of a dubious National Assembly nor the formation of a new government headed by the same corrupt leaders implementing the same devastating policies will be able to either relieve the sufferings of our people or prolong the death of our nation.”
The opposition claims to push for a system change through a series of fundamental reforms.

15 September 2003

CPP promptly reacts to King Sihanouk’s intention not to inaugurate the new National Assembly (2)
This morning (7:00 a.m. Phnom Penh time), opposition leader Sam Rainsy sent a letter by email to King Norodom Sihanouk informing the monarch that the 24 newly elected parliamentarians from his party (SRP) would not attend the inauguration ceremony of the National Assembly scheduled for the end of this month, unless the ruling CPP accepts a ballot recounting for two provinces – Svay Rieng and Kompong Thom – where the SRP slightly missed to win a seat or an additional seat at the National Assembly by only a few hundreds votes (KI, 15 August 2003: “Stunning refusal by the NEC to conduct ballot recounting”).
King Sihanouk replied to Sam Rainsy in a letter sent also by email by the Royal Palace Cabinet this afternoon (6:00 p.m.), saying in substance: “I want to inform you that because your party doesn’t accept to attend the National Assembly on 25, or 26, or 27 September, I will not go to the Assembly for the inauguration of its third term.” The King’s response to Sam Rainsy is consistent with his 2 September 2003 message to the Cambodian people: “According to our 1993 Constitution, I, in my capacity as King of Cambodia, must inaugurate the new National Assembly (...). I wish to inform the respected Cambodian people that, if among the three major political parties, namely the Cambodian People’s Party, the Funcinpec Party and the Sam Rainsy Party (...), there is one or two parties that do not accept to attend the [inaugural session of the] National Assembly on 25, or 26, or 27 September, that party must be responsible before the people and our Constitution, and, on my part, I will not be able to inaugurate the new Assembly and must not be held responsible on this issue.”
Fearing the possibility that the newly elected Assembly might not be able to convene by the end of this month, thus jeopardizing the formation of a new government led by outgoing Prime Minister Hun Sen, the CPP ordered Royal Palace Minister Kong Sam Ol to urgently issue this evening (9:00 p.m.) a letter sent by fax or delivered by special porter to each of the 123 newly elected parliamentarians from all parties asking them, “on behalf and under the instructions of His Majesty the King”, to attend “on 27 September 2003, at 10:00 a.m.”, the Assembly’s inauguration ceremony that will be “presided over by His Majesty the King”. This CPP’s last minute maneuver based on an obviously distorted presentation of the King’s intention, runs counter the Constitution which states that the King must personally convene and open in person any newly elected National Assembly (Article 82). The Constitution also states that the National Assembly must be composed of at least 120 representatives of the people (Article 76), meaning that practically all parliamentarians from all political parties – at least for this term – must accept to fulfill their function in order for the Assembly to proceed legally.         

4 September 2003 

Chea Sophara has his passport confiscated (3)
Former Phnom Penh Governor Chea Sophara, who was demoted in the wake of the January 29 anti-Thai riots, is still prevented from traveling abroad, since his passport was confiscated upon his return to Cambodia after a short trip to France last February (KI, 13 February 2003: “Chea Sophara left Cambodia today”). When the riots took place, the popular and ambitious governor was visiting the northern province of Preah Vihear with several high-ranking CPP officials who shared his views that Thailand’s influence must be contained.
Prime Minister Hun Sen was looking for an opportunity to sideline a dangerous rival before the July election (KI, 12 February 2003: “Chea Sophara’s removal was organized like a mini coup d’état”; KI, 11 February 2003: Chea Sophara is fired; KI, 10 February 2003: “Chea Sophara targeted by Hun Sen”; KI, 4 November 2002: “Chea Sophara will challenge Hun Sen as CPP candidate for premiership”).
Chea Sophara was successfully used as a scapegoat to diffuse tension between Cambodia and Thailand after the January 29 incident, allowing at the same time Hun Sen to get rid of his most formidable challenger within the CPP. The maneuver was performed with the blessing of Vietnam, which sees Hun Sen as the strongest pillar for a friendly regime in Cambodia.

3 September 2003

China urges King Sihanouk not to abdicate (3)
While the news seemed incredible at that time, Khmer Intelligence was the first, last year, to expose King Norodom Sihanouk’s desire to abdicate (KI, 25 September 2002, “King may abdicate”). The king formulated his desire from Beijing. But over the last few months, in Phnom Penh, he has been repeating that he would happily renounce the throne. In a message dated September 1st, he wrote in French: “Je ne rêve que d’abdication” (I only dream of abdicating).
There are several possible reasons that could explain why the king, who has expressed his profound frustrations with the current situation in Cambodia, has nevertheless refrained from actually abdicating. One of these reasons could be the position of China, which exerts its influence on Cambodia largely through its good relations with the Royal Palace. In the above-mentioned message, the king indirectly hinted at China’s position with regard to a possible abdication by saying that following such a dramatic decision, he would consider going to live not in China, but in North Korea where he has been warmly invited by Kim Djong Il.
For more detail: www.norodomsihanouk.info

Another version of the killing of three Western hostages in 1994 (2)
Responding to an allegation in Asia Times (29 August 2003, “Cambodia: The tale of two leaders”, by Alan Boyd) about the killing of three Western hostages in Cambodia in 1994, opposition leader Sam Rainsy reiterated his version of the story, which contradicted the report presented by the Phnom Penh government with the support of some diplomats at that time. 
"Another miscalculation by Rainsy has been his largely fruitless efforts to identify the CPP as sympathetic to the Khmer Rouge, largely because the government had offered an amnesty so it could disband the former communist movement. Diplomats reacted angrily to Rainsy's implication in 1995, never proven, that the CPP had 'deliberately sacrificed' three Western tourists who were killed after they strayed into a Khmer Rouge zone."
SR: The author's intention to unfairly tarnish my reputation clearly appears in his inaccurate and inconsistent presentation of facts. How could I, in 1995, try to make any political gain from the amnesty the Cambodian government had offered to the Khmer Rouge, since that amnesty was in fact granted only in 1996? In my capacity as finance minister, I personally remitted in July 1994 the money to be paid to the Khmer Rouge as ransom to secure the release of the three Western hostages. But a few months later, the hostages were killed, apparently as a result of a cynical game played by the Cambodian government. The game was to push the Khmer Rouge to make a desperate and tragic decision by not respecting the promise to pay them the ransom and stop bombing their positions on the ground. The ultimate objective of the government was to put all the blame for the tragedy on the Khmer Rouge in the eyes of foreign countries and to get more foreign (financial and military) aid to fight the rebel movement. I met with members of the hostages' families - the Wilsons in Australia and the Braquets in France - as well as parliamentarians in Canberra and Paris who were not so naive as to believe the version of the events given by complacent diplomats from their respective countries, who just swallowed the Cambodian government's misleading account of what had happened. [End]
For more detail: www.atimes.com

30 August 2003

Assembly must be convened on September 23 at the latest (2)
According to the Constitution, the National Assembly must be convened within 60 days of the general election. Since the last election took place on July 27, the King is supposed to convene the Assembly not later than September 25 in theory. But September 25 this year will coincide with a holiday, being part of a three-day holiday related to the celebration of the 10th anniversary of King Norodom Sihanouk’s re-accession to the throne and Phchum Ben religious festivities (September 24, 25 and 26). Therefore, the Assembly must be convened on September 23, 2003 at the latest in order to respect the Constitution and public holidays.  

Hun Sen to become the world’s longest serving prime minister (2)
After the expected resignation of Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir next October, Hun Sen will become the longest serving prime minister in the world. Among all top leaders including presidents, he will rank number 6 in terms of seniority.
1- Fidel Catro, President of Cuba, since 1959
2- Gnassingbe Eyadema, President of Togo, since 1967
3- Moammar Gaddafi, President of Libya, since 1969
4- Omar Bongo, President of Gabon, since 1972
5- Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, since 1980
6- Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia, since 1985. From 1979 to early 1985, he had been Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister in the Vietnamese-installed government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

29 August 2003

CPP considering resorting to old Assembly to preserve Hun Sen’s position (2)
Because they realize the increasing difficulty for Hun Sen to remain in power following the formation of the Alliance of Democrats, which is determined not to renew the current prime minister’s mandate for another five-year term, pro-Hun Sen elements within the CPP are considering convening – for a last time – the outgoing National Assembly in order to amend the Constitution so as to allow the formation of a government with the support of a fifty percent majority in Parliament. The objective is to abolish the currently paralyzing requirement for a two-thirds majority contained in the present Constitution as well as the even more stringent requirement represented by a seven-tenths quorum contained in the National Assembly internal rules.
The CPP, which controls 64 seats out of 122 in the outgoing Assembly, believes it could secure the support of 86 parliamentarians (to meet the seven-tenths quorum) by buying 22 parliamentarians from Funcinpec and/or SRP, especially among those MPs who have not been re-elected at the July 27, 2003 election.
In the new Assembly of 123 members, the CPP, which has been allocated 73 seats, would need to buy only 14 parliamentarians from other parties to secure a quorum of 87, covering a two-thirds majority of 82. But the extra 14 parliamentarians needed by the CPP would be harder to identify and buy since they have just been elected or re-elected for a five-year term and would be more reluctant to face the risk of being expelled from their party and stripped of their parliamentary seat. Unlike at the UN-organized election in 1993, the names of candidates were not made widely known to the public at the 2003 election, and nearly all the voters voted for a party, according to the proportional representation system, without even knowing the names of the party candidates.  

Hun Sen contradicting himself about the Alliance (2)
Speaking on August 25 about the newly formed Alliance of Democrats (KI, 27 August 2003, “Hun Sen’s statement about negotiation partners was intended for rival CPP leaders”), Prime Minister Hun Sen said the Alliance “died on the very day of its birth” to try to justify his refusal to negotiate with the Alliance, which asks for his removal. He went on saying that he expected negotiations to form a new government to begin only after the new Assembly will have been convened by the King, hopefully sometime in late September. He implied that, for the time being and until the Assembly meets, he had lost any hope to negotiate individually with Funcinpec and SRP because of the... Alliance, which therefore looks vibrant. 

No massive street protests against election results (2)
On August 30, the National Election Committee (NEC) will proclaim the “final election results”, which will correspond exactly to the figures first released by the ruling CPP immediately after the July 27 election, then confirmed by the NEC in its “preliminary results” published in the first week of August, and finally endorsed by the Constitutional Council when it rejected on August 27 all the complaints lodged by Funcinpec and SRP.
Most political observers have predicted that such a process of publishing controversial election results would trigger massive street protests, which the authorities would violently repress, as in 1998. But surprisingly, this scenario is not going to materialize. The first and major surprise, which dealt a serious blow to observers’ predictions, was the formation earlier this month of an unexpectedly strong and determined alliance between Funcinpec and SRP. The Alliance of Democrats has ruled out any street demonstration because it believes it has a more effective means to topple Prime Minister Hun Sen considered as the symbol of a failed system. The Alliance’s strategy now centers on the grouping of its forces in the newly elected National Assembly in order to legally push for the selection of a new prime minister (KI, 16 August 2003, “Funcinpec and SRP have the right to refuse Hun Sen as Prime Minister”), after predictably tough negotiations with the CPP to ensure a quick and effective implementation of a series of fundamental reforms, including the revision of election laws, and an overhaul of the NEC, the Constitutional Council, the Supreme Council of Magistracy, the National Audit Authority.     

Haing Botum, Raoul Jennar, and Allen Myers (3)
Following a KI report on 13 August 2003 entitled “Haing Botum and Raoul Jennar”, we have received the following message from one of our informants:
“You may be interested to learn and to report that the infamous Haing Botum is not the "Belgian charlatan" Raoul Jennar but a fellow named Allen Myers, a former Editor of the Green Left Review (also known as Direct Action) which is the official newspaper of the Trotskyst Party of Australia.
Myers is the spouse of Helen Jarvis, an Australian librarian from New South Wales University in Sydney, who has been working as an "Adviser" to [Hun Sen's right hand] Sok An on the question of the Khmer Rouge Librarian. Jarvis is also a member of the Trotskyst Party of Australia and has also worked as a research assistant for the Soeharto regime in Indonesia.
Her job with Sok An was funded through a fraudulent scheme by which the naive Australian government was misled to the tune of US$ 152,135 (or AUD$ 236,559). Both Myers and Jarvis were supporters of Democratic Kampuchea until 1978 and belonged to a group that organized a celebration on 17 April 1975 in Sydney to commemorate the takeover of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge.
Myers lives currently in Phnom Penh and writes regularly on Cambodia for the Green Left Review in Sydney always supporting the Hun Sen regime. He also works with Norbert Klein in Phnom Penh, who produces "The Mirror". They are both very active in anti-US activities in Phnom Penh.”

27 August 2003

Hun Sen’s statement about negotiation partners was intended for rival CPP leaders (2)
On August 25, Prime Minister Hun Sen stated his refusal to negotiate with the Alliance of Democrats (Funcinpec + SRP), which has asked for a tripartite government with a new prime minister. He suggested that Funcinpec and SRP send separate delegations to negotiate with a CPP delegation, which “must include Hun Sen in any case”. In fact, Hun Sen is worried by the possible intention of some CPP top leaders (Chea Sim, Sar Kheng, Say Chhum) to negotiate with the Alliance, which would result in his removal from his current position. Following the letter sent on August 23 by Prince Norodom Ranariddh on behalf of the Alliance to CPP President Chea Sim requesting to begin negotiations to form a government, Hun Sen has ordered his security forces to prevent Chea Sim and other CPP leaders from contacting the Alliance.     

26 August 2003

 How al-Qaida recruits and trains Muslim activists from Cambodia (3)
More and more information starts to appear in Cambodia about Jemaah Islamiyah. This terror group is affiliated with Bin Laden’s al-Qaida. It is allegedly led by Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali, who is accused of being involved in preparations for the September 11, 2001, attacks in the US, and of orchestrating last year’s deadly bomb attack in Bali as well as other terrorist attacks in many parts of the world. Hambali has stayed in Cambodia from September 2002 to March 2003 (The Cambodia Daily, 22 August 2003, “Hambali Left Gentle Impression in Phnom Penh”).
According to US intelligence reports, Jemaah Islamiyah has been very active in certain regions of Thailand. In particular, there is a special religious school in Narathiwat province, where more than 80% of the population are Muslims and speak Malay since the province shares its southern border with Malaysia. Students at that school come from Burma and Cambodia exclusively; Thai students are not accepted.
Students are selected among war orphans, whose character can be easily forged according to the organization’s requirements. After completing an initial program at Narathiwat province’s school, the foreign students are sent to further their studies in Malaysia. At a final stage, they are sent to Pakistan, where there is an appropriate training for them to become terrorists and members of al-Qaida’s network. After completion of their training, students are sent back to their respective countries, where they are supposed to conduct special operations. Some of the alleged terrorists recently arrested in Cambodia, with the cooperation of the CIA, have attended at least the Narathiwat province’s school. The CIA also helped in the arrest of Hambali in Ayutthaya (Thailand) on 15 August 2003.
Cambodia meets all the conditions (corruption, lawlessness, poverty, ignorance) to be a haven for terrorists as well as human and drug traffickers, whose networks are generally intertwined. 

Government-sponsored drug trafficking (3)
At the insistence of the Australian government and the US Drug Enforcement Administration office in Bangkok,  five persons have been recently arrested in Cambodia following the seizure on April 3, 2003, in Sydney, of 24 kg of heroin worth US$ 14.5 million hidden in a consignment of fish paste (“prohok”) imported from Cambodia.
The five persons appeared before the Phnom Penh Municipal Tribunal on August 25. The best known person among the suspects is Chea Tech, 57, President of Techvimex, a trading company close to the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and built on the same model as the more prominent Sokimex group, which controls a large portion of Cambodia’s economy.
Police officials have indicated that Techvimex had already been involved in the export of marijuana but interventions from high government spheres had stopped any investigation. The Techvimex case is reminiscent of the drug trafficking activities of the Mong Reththy group, a conglomerate also closely associated with the CPP and involved in the export of an exceptionally huge amount of marijuana just before the July 5-6, 1997 coup d’état. Group President Mong Reththy has financed a large number of schools bearing the name of Prime Minister Hun Sen.
In the present case, the other alleged mastermind of the heroin trafficking ring, besides Chea Tech, is Kao Van Lan, 63, an Australian citizen who is also Vice- President of the Vietnamese Residents Association in Cambodia.
Both Sokimex President Sok Kong and Techvimex President Chea Tech are Cambodians of Vietnamese descent.         

24 August 2003

Hun Sen to return today from Vietnam (2)
Prime Minister and CPP Vice-President Hun Sen who left for Vietnam earlier this week (KI, 21 August 2003, “Hun Sen considers stepping down”) is to return to Cambodia today, after a three-day visit to the neighbouring country. His entourage has said he had to under
go a medical check-up there. But observers have noticed that, over the last few years, any health problems have led Hun Sen and his wife Bun Rany to either Bangkok or Singapore.

CPP trying to buy leaders of smaller parties (2)
The CPP seems upset by the argument developed by the Alliance of Democrats (KI, 22 August 2003, “
Official launching of the Alliance of Democrats”) stressing the fact that in spite of serious election irregularities, the former communist ruling party collected only 47.3% of the popular votes at the last election (KI, 12 August 2003, “A relative and questionable victory for the CPP”). This implies that a majority of voters (52.7%) who did not vote for the CPP apparently wanted a leadership or policy change for the country. The Alliance of Democrats has started to use this argument to justify its demand for the removal of current Prime Minister Hun Sen and a reform of the system he represents.
The opposition SRP and the royalist Funcinpec party respectively collected 21.9% and 20. 7% of the votes, making a total of 42.6% for the Alliance, and leaving 10.1% to the 20 smaller parties which will not be represented at the National Assembly.
The CPP is now reportedly trying to buy the leadership of some of the smaller parties in order to lure them into an open alliance with the ruling party and show public opinion that the CPP and its newly proclaimed “allies” form a bloc that must be credited with winning a majority of the popular votes.
During their election campaign (before July 27), none of these smaller parties had hinted they were working with or for the CPP; they rather presented themselves as alternatives to the CPP, in the same manner as SRP or Funcinpec. In the mind of most voters, voting for any of the 22 non-CPP parties meant voting for a change, and any subsequent affiliation with the CPP leading to a preservation of the status quo, would mean a betrayal of their will.     

23 August 2003

Hun Sen first wanted to kill Sam Rainsy in 1994 (2)
In an article titled “Differences Buried to Form Political Alliance” published on 20 August 2003, the Cambodia Daily wrote: “In January 1995, the Voice of Khmer Youth reported [Prince Norodom Ranariddh] had joked about killing Sam Rainsy at a birthday party for his wife, Princess Marie Ranariddh. The prince later told reporters he was only joking when he said: “Soon there will be another widow in Phnom Penh – Saumura,” referring to Sam Rainsy’s wife, parliamentarian Tioulong Saumura”.
The missing part of the story was a visit that [then Second Prime Minister] Hun Sen had paid to [then First Prime Minister] Prince Ranariddh at the latter’s residence on 21 December 1994, during which the visiting guest (Hun Sen) submitted to the host (Ranariddh) a plan that consisted in assassinating [then Funcinpec dissident] Sam Rainsy. The visit coincidentally took place on the eve of Princess Marie Ranariddh’s birthday. Prince Ranariddh objected to the plan on the grounds that it would create “complications”. But the prince, who had not been educated as a killer like Hun Sen, was a little bit shocked by the plan. He wanted to indirectly warn Sam Rainsy whose father-in-law Nhiek Tioulong – Saumura’s father – had succeeded (then Prince, now King) Norodom Sihanouk as Funcinpec President until 1992. This was the reason behind his “joke”.  

22 August 2003 

Official launching of the Alliance of Democrats (1)
Funcinpec President Prince Norodom Ranariddh and SRP President Sam Rainsy today signed the “Internal Rules and Organizational Structure” of the Alliance of Democrats, which is a grouping of the two parties intended to challenge the ruling former communist CPP. One of the aims and objectives of the Alliance is to “merge the two political parties into one single party at an opportune moment.” At today's meeting, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Sam Rainsy and Prince Norodom Sirivudh were elected as the Alliance's President, First Vice-President and Second Vice-President respectively, while Senator Ou Bun Long (SRP) will serve as Secretary General. A “Launching Ceremony” for the Alliance will be organized before the press on 23 August 2003.  

Diplomats ending their mission in Cambodia (1)
The following diplomats or international organisations representatives will be leaving Cambodia in the next few days or weeks:
- Japan: Ambassador Gotaro Ogawa (after 3 years in Cambodia)
- France: Ambassador André-Jean Libourel (5 years)
- UNDP: Resident Representative (Ms.) Dominique Aït Ouyahia-McAdams (4 years). 

King confirms KI story about Cambodia’s two “terrible” ladies (1)
In a 10 August 2003 message in French entitled “Drôlerie” (funny thing), King Norodom Sihanouk recalled a conversation he had with Prime Minister Hun Sen “more than a year ago” about two prominent Cambodian ladies, which confirms a story first published by Khmer Intelligence on 12 September 2002 under the title “Hun Sen complains to the King about Tioulong Saumura and Norodom Vacheara”. More exactly, Hun Sen told the King: “If Cambodia had 20 ladies as terrible as Princess Norodom Vacheara and Ms. Tioulong Saumura, our country would be in trouble, just like a sinking ship”. The King replied to Hun Sen: “Your Excellency doesn’t need and will not need to worry since we will be always short of 9 Vachearas and 9 Saumuras to reach this figure of 20”.

21 August 2003

Hun Sen considers stepping down (3)
Prime Minister Hun Sen held a meeting at his Tuol Krasaing residence (near Takhmao
city, in Kandal province) yesterday afternoon (August 20). The meeting was attended by 26 CPP officials who are his closest supporters. During the meeting intended to determine a strategy to avoid a political deadlock following the last election, Hun Sen stated that he would accept, in the last resort, to step down from his current position, but on one condition: that his successor is designated by him, without anyone having the right to oppose his choice. To succeed him, he would probably choose his right hand Sok An, who is currently a senior Minister supervising the extensive domain of the powerful Council of Ministers Office. Hun Sen himself would consider becoming President of the National Assembly.
This morning, Hun Sen flew by helicopter from his Tuol Krasaing residence for a short trip to nearby Vietnam.

Poipet’s test case for redressing election irregularities (2)
It was in Poipet commune (in Banteay Meanchey province) that the ruling CPP most effectively implemented its tactics to lower the voter turnout rate at the July 27, 2003 election (KI, 15 August 2003, “CPP's victory based on deliberate measures to prevent scores of potential voters from voting”).
Poipet, which is situated on the border with Thailand, is Cambodia’s largest commune with a growing population of around 100,000 inhabitants. It is a stronghold of the opposition SRP, which won a majority of the popular votes at the previous parliamentary election in 1998 and the commune council election in 2002.
The majority of the population is made up of destitute (often landless) farmers, labourers, construction workers, small employees, porters, cart pullers, street vendors, who live on the thriving cross-border trade. The city attracts jobless people from all over the country.
On July 27, the CPP-organized chaos in Poipet was the worst among all Cambodia’s 1621 communes, resulting in the highest percentage of registered voters being unable to cast their ballots
and a unique decline in the citizen participation rate (see line F on the chart below). For countless eligible voters, the location of their polling station had been changed without sufficient notice to a remote place difficult to find or to some place that does not exist, such as “Khloeng” village or “Thmor Pich” village that nobody can locate on any map.
For Banteay Meanchey province, according to a specific mathematical formula for seat allocation (KI, 19 August 2003, “
A manipulated proportional representation system”), the SRP needs only 1,498 more votes to get one additional parliamentary seat. These 1,498 lacking votes represent only 0.65% of total votes cast in the whole Banteay Meanchey province or 8.01% of total votes cast in Poipet alone. If, without the above-described chaos, voter turnout in Poipet had been in 2003 the same as in 2002, i.e. 61.3% instead of 46.1% (see line E on the chart below), there would have been more than 6,000 additional voters at the July 27 election. These additional voters would have come mainly from the poorest segments of the population, which constitute the bulk of SRP supporters but were deprived of their right to vote last month. The SRP was the only party to see an increase of its votes in Banteay Meanchey province from 2002 to 2003 (see line J on the chart below).
Without the particular harassment inflicted on thousands of voters in Poipet, the SRP would have probably won an additional parliamentary seat representing Banteay Meanchey province. This is why the opposition party has asked for a re-voting in Poipet. After a refusal by the NEC earlier this month, a final judgment will be rendered by the Constitutional Council next week.

ELECTIONS

2002

2003

2002

2003

2002

2003

 

Cambodia

Cambodia

Banteay

Banteay

Poipet

Poipet

 

(local)

(national)

Meanchey

Meanchey

commune

commune

     

province

province

(local)

(national)

     

(local)

(national)

   

A- Voting-age population

 6,230,314

   6,749,876

    326,542

    347,803     

      40,000 (*)

     45,000 (*)

B- Registered voters 

 5,190,307

   6,341,834

    251,226

    307,811    

      29,678

     40,561

C- Voter registration rate (B/A)              83.3%                93.9%              77.0%              88.5%              74.2%             90.1%

D- Actual voters (total votes)

 4,543,974

   5,277,494

    209,039

    228,440

      18,197  

     18,694

E- Voter turnout rate (D/B)

             87.5%

               83.2%

             83.2%

             74.2%

             61.3%

            46.1%

F- Citizen participation rate (D/A)              72.9%                78.2%              64.0%              65.7%              45.5%             41.5%

G- Null and void votes

    171,261

      108,657

      10,602

        4,263

           612

          324

H- Valid votes (D-G = I+J+K+L)

 4,372,713

   5,168,837

    198,437

    224,177 

      17,585         

     18,370  

I- CPP votes

 2,674,303

   2,447,259

    117,716

    106,655

        6,429

       7,255

J- SRP votes

    731,150

   1,130,423

      35,512

      51,831

        7,881

       6,670

K- Funcinpec votes

    958,326

   1,072,313

      45,112

      43,535

        3,275

       2,952

L- Other (smaller) parties votes       

        8,934

      518,842

             97

      22,156

               0

       1,493

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(*) Estimates that better reflect the real voting-age population of Poipet. Official figures provided by the police (33,030 for 2002, and 36,289 for 2003) obviously underestimate the real voting-age population, as evidenced by the number of citizens registered as voters by the NEC in January-February 2003 (40,561), which is noticeably larger than the figure for the corresponding voting-age population given by the police (36,289).

19 August 2003

A subtle form of cheating during the ballot counting process (2)
A subtle form of election cheating could have taken place during the ballot counting process, which started one day after polling day on July 27, 2003. The rules and regulations of the National Election Committee (NEC) state that the tally sheet, Form 1105, must be given to political party agents immediately after the counting process is completed, meaning normally before the end of the day on July 28. But this was not put into practice in numerous provinces and polling stations, where the tally sheets, at best, were given only very late in the night of July 28; some had even been withheld for several days after the deadline. It is too late now to do anything about it since there is a serious possibility that the ballots could have been manipulated during that period of time when party agents and independent election observers were not present, with the corresponding tally sheets given after the deadline containing figures which had also been manipulated. 
 

A manipulated proportional representation system (2)
Parliamentary elections in Cambodia are supposed to be based on a proportional representation system. But the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and its electoral arm, the National Election Committee (NEC), have manipulated the election system through discretionary changes in mathematical formulas used for parliamentary seat allocation (KI, 26 March 2003, “Controversial election expert to be hired by UNDP”) , discriminatory measures to exclude a large number of citizens from the election process (KI, 15 August 2003, “CPP's victory based on deliberate measures to prevent scores of potential voters from voting”), ballot tampering (KI, August 19, “A subtle form of cheating during the ballot counting process”), and refusal to conduct ballot recounting (KI, 15 August 2003, “Stunning refusal by the NEC to conduct ballot recounting”), all this being done in such a way so as to seriously distort the will of the people and the spirit of proportional representation.

In the end, as shown in the chart below, the CPP manages to get a seat at the National Assembly with  only 33,524 votes on average, whereas for a same seat Funcinpec needs 41,242 votes (23% more), and the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) must collect 47,100 votes (40% more). Under these circumstances, it is rather surprising and disturbing to hear international election observers declare Cambodia’s last election “free and fair”.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SEAT ALLOCATION IN 2003

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Political parties                                                           

CPP

Funcinpec

SRP

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A- Number of votes collected (*)

         2,447,259    

          1,072,313

          1,130,423

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

B- Number of seats allocated  (**)

           73

             26

              24

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

C- Number of votes per seat (A/B)

              33,524

               41,242

               47,100 

 

 

 

 
 

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(*) Official preliminary results published by the NEC.
(**) Unofficial calculation using the latest formula for seat allocation adopted by the NEC.

16 August 2003

Funcinpec and SRP have the right to refuse Hun Sen as Prime Minister (2)
Following the July 27 election, some analysts argue that Funcinpec and SRP are behaving like bad losers by blocking the formation of a new government. They claim that the new government must be led by Hun Sen since he has been designated as candidate for Prime Minister by the CPP, which has won the election. To counter these arguments, the following remarks can be made:
- In 1993, the CPP lost the UN-organized election. Having obtained only 51 seats at the National Assembly, they imposed on Funcinpec, which had won the election, the constitutional requirement for any government to have the support of a two-third majority of the National Assembly, thus leading to an unusual power-sharing scheme with the appointment of two Prime Ministers
! In 2003, the CPP won a majority of the popular votes but the Alliance of Democrats (Funcinpec + SRP) has secured at least 50 seats at the National Assembly, a score very similar to the one achieved by the CPP in 1993. Therefore, following the same rules of the game established ten years ago, the Alliance of Democrats should be able to negotiate with the CPP a power-sharing scheme similar to the one agreed upon by all parties in 1993.
- As the “winning party”, the CPP has the right to designate Mr. Hun Sen (or anybody else) as their candidate for Prime Minister, but the Alliance of Democrats has the right to vote or not to vote for that candidate when a secret ballot is organized at the National Assembly, as stipulated in the Constitution. If their first candidate fails (maybe twice successively) to gather two thirds of the votes, then the CPP will have to designate another candidate if they want to avoid a stalemate. In ancient Rome, when Emperor Caligula wanted to appoint his horse as a Senator, many decent people legitimately objected to his plan.

Hun Sen needs to buy 14 parliamentarians from Funcinpec and/or SRP (2)
According to official provisional results of the July 27 legislative election proclaimed by the NEC, the CPP has obtained 73 seats at the new National Assembly, which is made up of 123 members. Therefore, in the well-known plan for Hun Sen to be elected Prime Minister for another 5-year term, the CPP needs to secure the support of 9 parliamentarians from Funcinpec and/or SRP in order to obtain a two-third majority of 82 parliamentarians, as required by the Constitution.
But according to the National Assembly internal regulations, there is an even more stringent requirement represented by a quorum of seven tenths, meaning that out of the 123 Assembly members, at least 87 (the figure of 86.1 must be round up) must be
physically present for any parliamentary session to proceed legally. In other words, in order to cope with a possible boycott by Funcinpec and SRP, the CPP must buy at least 14 parliamentarians from the two other parties represented in Parliament to be able to convene the new National Assembly and proceed with the election of Hun Sen as Prime Minister. This scenario is very unlikely to materialize with the strengthening of the Alliance of Democrats that has been forged between Funcinpec and SRP in order to legally topple Hun Sen.

15 August 2003 

CPP's victory based on deliberate measures to prevent scores of potential voters from voting (2)
As shown in our chart comparing the results of the last four elections in Cambodia (KI, 12 August 2003, “A relative and questionable victory for the CPP”), the
ruling party gains determining advantage in preventing scores of eligible voters from voting. Actually, the lower the voter turnout rate, the better the result for Prime Minister Hun Sen’s party.
The ruling CPP, which tightly controls the population throughout the country through communist-type cells represented by groups of ten houses/families overseen by devoted village chiefs, can easily mobilize its supporters to go to vote by providing them with all kind of facilities, while the other political parties have more difficulty in identifying and mobilizing their supporters, who are more scattered and more afraid to reveal their political preference.
Although the CPP claims to currently have 4 million members, the actual number of their more or less voluntary supporters does not exceed 2.5 million, which amounts to only 36% of the 6.80 million people representing the total number of citizens with the right to vote (over 18 year-old). Therefore, in order to obtain a higher percentage of the popular votes at any elections, the CPP must prevent as many non-CPP supporters as possible from casting their ballot. The non-CPP supporters are identified and targeted by their village chiefs, who use monitoring and spying methods commonly used in communist countries where the ruling party has the State apparatus at its disposal.
Over the last ten years, voter turnout rates have steadily dropped from 96% to 83 %, thus allowing the CPP to continuously secure a majority of the popular votes in subtly manipulated elections
and to remain in power until now.
At the last July 27, 2003 election, it has been reported that organized chaos was put into full force when many voters turned up only to find that their polling station had been moved to another location. Not able to find the right polling station, they were discouraged and went home without voting. 
In other instances, potential voters with all their ID cards and voters cards in order found that their names had just simply been crossed out. They were told that they had “already voted” and were prevented from casting their ballot.
In yet still other instances, village chiefs and commune heads, using intimidation or bribe, had collected voting cards
or ID cards, which were never returned to their legitimate owners. The concerned eligible voters were therefore forced to give up their voting right.
It must also be noted here that 63% of the adult population in Cambodia are illiterate
, which means that hundreds of thousands of people cannot read a voters list and were not able to find their names. There are reports stating that CPP-appointed election officers in no way helped voters who were trying to vote. On the contrary, they just sent them back to the lists posted outside the polling station, thus causing utter confusion. In the end, the concerned eligible voters became discouraged and went home without voting.
Normally, election officers are under the obligation to help the voters, and not hinder the process. Receiving special treatment, CPP supporters were given a slip of paper by their village chief containing the voter’s name and registration number, and were able to go through the process smoothly, with no hassle.
Unfortunately, most international election observers failed to observe the above-described subtle methods used by the CPP to manipulate the 2003 parliamentary election, which they hastily declared “free and fair”.

Stunning refusal by the NEC to conduct ballot recounting (2)
In any democratic elections, when one candidate or competing party wins over the other(s) by an extremely small margin (generally less than 0.5%) after the first ballot counting, a ballot recounting is ordered automatically, without anybody having to ask for it. But for the July 27, 2003 parliamentary election in Cambodia, the CPP-controlled National Election Committee (NEC) has adamantly refused to comply with this principle, which is based on the recognition of the fact that a small human error with far-reaching implications is always possible, even without intentional malice.
For instance,
in Svay Rieng province, the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) needs only 146 more votes (or 0.06% of a total of 231,859 valid votes) to get one parliamentary seat. And in Kompong Thom province, the SRP needs only 375 more votes (or 0.16 % of a total of 233,286 valid votes) to win an additional seat at the National Assembly. In spite (or because) of alleged irregularities in the initial ballot counting, the NEC asserts that there is no need to conduct any recounting. In a few days, the NEC’s stunning decision will likely be endorsed by the CPP-controlled Constitutional Council, which acts as an appeal court for election disputes. Will international election observers maintain that the 2003 election in Cambodia was “free and fair”?

13 August 2003 

The CPP took US$ 40 million from government funds to finance its election campaign (2)
Figures published this month by the Finance Ministry related to the implementation of the State budget for 2003 show that the Hun Sen government earlier this year borrowed US$ 40 million from the National Bank of Cambodia and private banks to finance the CPP election campaign prior to the July 27, 2003 poll. The IMF office in Phnom Penh, which is supposed to monitor the government fiscal and monetary policy, has not reacted yet to this unorthodox and inflationary way of financing a most controversial spending by the current Cambodian government, whose survival heavily depends on international financial assistance. 

Haing Botum and Raoul Jennar (3)
Over the last few weeks, many persons interested in developments in Cambodia have received a series of e-mails from a person who calls himself Haing Botum. The pro-CPP arguments developed by Haing Botum are exactly the same as the ones developed by Raoul Jennar, a controversial Belgian self-proclaimed expert on Cambodian affairs, who used to publish his writings defending the Hun Sen regime in the aftermath of the 1998 election in a pro-CPP Phnom Penh-based newspaper called “The Vision” (KI, 8 August 2003). But “The Vision” has ceased to exist after its editor was prosecuted a few years ago for blackmail and forgery.

12 August 2003

A relative and questionable victory for the CPP (2)
The ruling former communist Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) apparently won the July 27, 2003 national election. But an in-depth analysis based on detailed figures covering the last four elections in Cambodia (see chart below) shows that the CPP, in spite of the questionable methods it has been using to control the election process, is in fact losing ground.
Even after cleverly preventing some 1.5 million citizens with the right to vote from actually exercising their right to vote through political discrimination during the voter registration process in January-February 2003 and organized chaos on July 27, 2003 (see lines F and G on the chart), leading to the lowest voter turnout ever (line E), the CPP’s share of the popular votes dropped from 61.2% in 2002 to 47.3% in 2003 (line J).
The CPP claims for itself the right to govern the country with an iron fist even though the number of its voters represents only 36.3% of the adult population with the right to vote (line K). Measured that way, the level of popular support for the CPP has remained remarkably stable and relatively low over the last ten years, irrespective of its controversial elections methods based on voter intimidation, vote buying, and ballot tampering (line K).
Most international election observers have failed to pay due attention to some of the most recent and most subtle forms of election manipulation used by the CPP to distort the will of the Cambodian people. At the 2003 election, the CPP made full use of the State apparatus under its control (from the Ministry of Interior to village chiefs) to ultimately exclude a significantly large number of potential voters from the election process whenever those potential voters were suspected of sympathy for any party other than the CPP, as reported by their village chiefs.
Most young voters (between 18 and 25), especially first-time voters did not vote for the CPP at the last election, as indicated by figures on the chart below. From 2002 to 2003, the number of citizens registered on voter lists increased by 1.15 million, representing mainly first-time eligible voters (line B). But the number of actual voters increased by only 0.74 million because of the organized chaos on voting day (line D), while the number of valid votes increased by 0.8 million (line H).
The different political parties did not benefit evenly from the increase in the number of voters from 2002 to 2003. The CPP saw the number of its voters decrease by 0.22 million (line I), reflecting its declining trend. Funcinpec made a slight gain of 0.11 million voters (line L). At the same time, an additional 0.40 million people voted for the SRP, which appears as the main winner of this election (lines O and P). The 20 other, smaller and mostly newly-formed parties collected an additional 0.51 million votes (line R). In any case, all the votes for non-CPP parties (52.7% of valid votes) indicate that a majority of the electorate wants a regime change or, at least, a change in the country’s leadership.   

ELECTIONS                                                                 1993            1998           2002         2003
  (national) (national) (local) (national)
In million unless otherwise specified        
         
A- Citizens with the right to vote (18+) 4.50 5.49 6.23 6.75
         
B- Citizens registered on voter lists 4.25 (*) 5.40 5.19 6.34
         
C- Voter registration rate (B/A) 94% (*) 98% 83% 93%
         
D- Actual voters (number of votes) 4.10 5.06 4.54 5.28
         
E- Voter turnout (D/B) 96% 94% 87% 83%
         
F- Citizens prevented from voting (A-D) 0.40 0.43 1.69 1.47
         
G- Citizens discarded in % of total citizens (F/A) 8.9% 7.8% 27.1% 21.8%
         
H- Valid votes 4.01 4.90 4.37 5.17
         
I- Votes for CPP in million 1.53 2.03 2.67 (**) 2.45
         
J- Votes for CPP in % of valid votes (I/H) 38.2% 41.4% 61.2% (**) 47.3%
         
K- Votes for CPP in % of total citizens (I/A) 34.0% 37.0% 42.9% (**) 36.3%
         
L- Votes for Funcinpec (FCP) in million 1.82 1.55 0.96 1.07
         
M- Votes for FCP in % of valid votes (L/H) 45.4% 31.7% 21.9% 20.7%
         
N- Votes for FCP in % of total citizens (L/A) 40.4% 28.3% 15.4% 15.9%
         
O- Votes for Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) in million (***) 0.70 0.73 1.13
         
P- Votes for SRP in % of valid votes (O/H) (***) 14.3% 16.7% 21.9%
         
Q- Votes for SRP in % of total citizens (O/A) (***) 12.7% 11.7% 16.7%
         
R- Votes for other (smaller) parties in million (****) 0.66 0.62 0.01 0.52
         
S- Votes for other parties in % of valid votes (R/H) 16.4% 12.6% 0.2% 10.1%
         
T- Votes for other parties in % of total citizens (R/A) 14.7% 11.3% 0.2% 7.7%

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(*) In 1993, UNTAC was unable to register a portion of the population living in Khmer Rouge zones.
(**) In 2002, the CPP resorted to a massive and systematic vote-buying on the eve of voting day, during the “Night of the Barking Dogs”
("Riatrei Chhkae Pruh").
(***) Non applicable. In 1993, Sam Rainsy was a Funcinpec
member. The SRP was founded only in 1995.
(****) Number of other (smaller) political parties taking part in the election: in 1993: 18; in 1998: 36; in 2002: 8; in 2003: 20.
Sources: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), National Election Committee (NEC), political parties (CPP, Funcinpec, SRP).

8 August 2003

King Sihanouk distances himself from Funcinpec (1)
On 6 August 2003, the Royal Palace issued a hand-written message
dated the same day from King Norodom Sihanouk under the headline: Annotation of His Majesty Norodom Sihanouk on an article of Cambodge Soir, Tuesday, 5 August 2003, entitled “Funcinpec: The Reasons of a Failure”.
The King reacted to views expressed by Raoul Jennar, a self-proclaimed expert on Cambodia
, who is known for his sympathy for the Hun Sen regime. The controversial Belgian NGO worker had insulted the King several times in the past. Last year, he reportedly and unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a position as adviser to CPP Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong. 
The King wrote: “Mr. Raoul Jennar has always hated me. But the Cambodian people are well aware that the Funcinpec is not King Sihanouk. Our People judge our Monarchy through my acts, my private life, the services I render every day, every week, every month, every year, to the Fatherland, the People, the Nation, the Religion (and Queen Monineath with me), and not through the Funcinpec, its Princes and Princesses.”
Original version in French: “M. Raoul Jennar m’a toujours détesté. Or le Peuple cambodgien sait bien que le Funcinpec n’est pas le Roi Sihanouk. Notre Peuple juge notre Monarchie à travers mes actes, ma vie privée, les services que je rends chaque jour, chaque semaine, chaque mois, chaque année à la Patrie, au Peuple, à la Nation, à la Religion (et la Reine Monineath avec moi) et non pas à travers le Funcinpec, ses Princes et ses Princesses. ” 

6 August 2003

Funcinpec and Sam Rainsy Party join forces at the grassroots level (1)
Funcinpec Secretary General Prince Norodom Sirivudh and SRP Secretary General Eng Chhay Eang signed today a joint instruction to commune council members of their respective parties, asking them “to closely cooperate in order to serve the people at the grassroots level, in particular to join forces to ensure the security of members of the two parties.” Furthermore, local leaders from the two parties “must show determination and courage in order to counter intimidation from other people, while avoiding verbal attacks and provocations that could lead to violence.”
This joint instruction is a
concrete result of the Cooperation Agreement signed on August 4, 2003 by Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy, launching the “Alliance of Democrats” to counter the ruling former communist Cambodian People’s Party (CPP).
At the February 3, 2002 commune council election, Funcinpec and SRP won commune chief positions for only 10 and 13 communes respectively, out of a total of 1,621 communes. But if their commune council members join hands now, they can take the control of some 250 communes, many of which are large communes in urban areas.
Following the July 27, 2003 parliamentary election, SRP has become the number one party in 145 communes (including 56 in Phnom Penh), and Funcinpec is the strongest party in 92 communes. The Alliance of Democrats has more popular support than the CPP in 557 communes.

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